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BOOTSTRAPPING AND SLOUCHING TOWARD
GOMORRAH: ARBITRAL INFATUATION AND THE
DECLINE OF CONSENT'
Jeffrey W. Stempel'
INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF ARBITRATION, THE DECLINE OF
CONSENT, AND THE DEBASEMENT OF THE LAW
Richard Speidel's contribution to the Symposium, like his
work throughout the area of arbitration, leaves little with
which a reasonable person might disagree. In particular, his
prime thesis makes sense in the context of securities arbitra-
tion. Professor Speidel concludes that consent has gone the
way of the dodo bird for securities arbitration and that the law
should focus on substantive regulation to encourage fairness in
arbitration. I do not dispute this assessment so much as I want
to supplement it: There remains a valuable role for consent
concepts to play in securities arbitration, if only the courts will
allow it.
Beyond this picking at the edges of Professor Speidel's as-
sessment, however, his paper raises a more profound issue
affecting securities arbitration and other forms of arbitration.
The matter of consent has implications not only for all forms of
arbitration and alternative dispute resolution ("ADR), but for
contract law and jurisprudence in general. Because of both the
overriding importance of the law's treatment of consent and
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my lack of any major criticism of Professor Speidel's assess-
ment of the current state of securities arbitration and the
Ruder Report,1 my focus is instead directed to questions Pro-
fessor Speidel essentially leaves for another day after having
set the stage for further conversation: whither consent? This
Comment addresses overarching jurisprudential concerns re-
garding party autonomy and legal legitimacy. Specifically, I
suggest modifying modern arbitrability doctrine to take con-
sent seriously. The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") should be
construed through a functional brand of flexible interpretation.
Such an interpretation would be evenhanded in its application
to consumers, employees, and franchisees as well as to the
securities industry and larger business community.2
Although I am perhaps the last person in legal academia
to endorse Robert Bork's world view or find in his writings a
muse, his recent book Slouching Towards Gomorrah,3 provid-
ed a catalyst for organizing my misgivings about modern arbi-
tration doctrine and my concern that leading authorities like
Professor Speidel have too quickly abandoned defense of the
consent paradigm of contract in the context of dispute resolu-
tion. As readers of the popular press are aware, Judge Bork
argues that by relaxing our commitment to bedrock values and
legal principles, we as a society have "slouched" toward a world
of moral relativism that has diminished our society in both
tangible and intangible ways.4 According to Judge Bork, the
"Gomorrah" comparison is not farfetched because our society is
an America in "decline" that, like the biblical Gomorrah, shows
signs of becoming both more sinful and more tolerant of sin.'
But despite its marquee value, Judge Bork never really
develops the Gomorrah metaphor. He assumes that Gomorrah
' See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION
REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE (1996).
2 Although arbitration involving investors raises serious issues of consent, for
reasons set forth below, I find the consent aspects of broker-investor arbitration
considerably less troublesome than those afflicting brokerage house-employee arbi-
tration and other instances of essentially mandated arbitration or forum selection.
See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377,
1447-50 (1991) [hereinafter Better Approachl.
3 See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GoMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM
AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996).
Id. at 6-9.
Id. at 2.
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is bad and thus serves as a useful rhetorical foil. But sin comes
in many varieties, including a rush to ride roughshod over
individual rights and basic notions of fairness in the heat of
pursuing a popular current goal. In essence, this is the indict-
ment Bork levels at modem liberalism as he characterizes it. A
similar criticism can be leveled at arbitration zealots of the
1980s and 1990s, including most of the Supreme Court.
The securities industry pursues uniform arbitration to low-
er the disputing costs associated with litigation and gain the
benefit of expert decisionmaking. But the industry also seeks
through arbitration to prevent full public viewing of some
practices or episodes, to eliminate juries, to lower the possibili-
ty of punitive damages awards, and to prevent the establish-
ment and publication of adverse precedent. Let me be clear. I
see nothing inherently wrong with an industry pursuing these
goals, so long as it does so through legitimate and noncoercive
means. As former U.S. Senator S.I. Hayakawa once remarked
about America's acquisition of the Panama Canal through a
series of crafty colonial imperialist moves, "We stole it fair and
square."6 I am not naive enough to suggest that private busi-
ness consistently (or perhaps ever) put altruism before profit-
ability. However, the legal system should require that busi-
ness, when pursuing profit at the close of this century, do so
within the rules of the game regarding contract and social
regulation in general. Consequently, consent retains a useful
role in regulating the ability of business to pursue self-interest
through contract.
In the case of the securities industry, a Gomorrah of sorts
emerges from the shoving of nonconsensual arbitration down
the figurative throats of customers and employees. For reasons
discussed further below and at length in other writings,' bro-
ker-customer arbitration comes close to satisfying a consent-
based model of arbitrability, but some arbitration "agreements"
so lack consent as to embarrass the courts.
6 Stanley Meisler, Combat in Panama: Panamanians Have a Long History of
Dependence on U.S., LA. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1989, at A9.
' See, e.g., Stempel, Better Approach, supra note 2, at 1383-90; Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the
Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991
J. DisP. REs. 259, 300 [hereinafter The Employment Exclusionl ("consent of the
average employee to arbitration is highly suspect").
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Imagine the potential for enforced arbitration throughout
society if the courts treat new uses of arbitration clauses as
they have securities arbitration "agreements."8 A customer
purchases a coffee pot with a major credit card and signs the
purchase form, which on the back contains an arbitration
8 But see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's
Associates v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001 (1996) [hereinafter Arbitra-
tion and Unconscionabilityl; Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Volun-
tary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83 (1996) [hereinafter Employment Arbitration).
To some extent, this potential has already been realized. Courts have ruled en-
forceable arbitration clauses contained in "contracts" enclosed in shipping boxes or
shrink-wrapped around computer software. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (packing materials of computer shipment);
ProUD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451-52 (7th Cir. 1996) (software shrink-
wrap).
To the common sense of the public, shrink-wrap contract cases like ProCD
seem so wrongly decided that they have become fodder for Dilbert cartoons. See,
e.g., Scott Adams, Dilbert, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Jan. 14, 1997, at C7 (Dilbert:
"I didn't read all of the shrink-wrap license agreement on my new software until
after I opened it. Apparently, I agreed to spend the rest of my life as a towel boy
in Bill Gates's new mansion.").
The Gateway court cited with approval Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shuts,
499 U.S. 585 (1991), enforcing a forum selection clause in fine print on the back
of a ticket, a case Professor Shell cites as the optimal illustration of the depths to
which the Supreme Court has descended and that the Court "has abandoned any
role in policing contracts for fair play." See G. Richard Shell, Fair Play, Consent
and Securities Arbitration: A Comment on Speidel, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1365, 1372-
74 (1996).
In the articles cited above, Professor Ware largely defends the Supreme
Court's approach to contract questions and defends a more formal and objective
theory of contract than I advance in this Comment. However, Professor Ware
ultimately concludes that the arbitration required of securities industry employees
lacks sufficient volition and also suggests reversal of the separability doctrine. This
doctrine permits arbitrators to decide in the first instance issues related to defens-
es to enforcement of the contract as a whole where the scope of the written arbi-
tration agreement ostensibly encompasses the dispute.
I find Professor Ware's argument for overruling Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), most interesting and worth further explora-
tion. The separability doctrine is problematic. See Stempel, Better Approach, supra
note 2, at 1390-92 (referring to Prima Paint "problem"). Preliminarily, however, I
am inclined to retain Prima Paint so long as the judiciary continues to adhere to
the unrealistic, formal and narrow view of contract consent and meaning demon-
strated in recent cases. Although I agree with much of Professor Ware's analysis,
he endorses an excessively narrow view of contract consent that admits of relief
for the targeted party under too few circumstances. For example, by placing undue
emphasis on the distinction between private and public conduct, Professor Ware
would refuse enforcement of the U-4 arbitration forms executed by securities em-
ployees but bind nonsecurities employees to mandated arbitration when virtually
all employees are similarly deprived of a position to effect real voluntary consent
to arbitration.
[Vol. 62: 13811384
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clause. If the coffee pot ignites a fire that destroys his house
and kills members of his family, should he really be required
to arbitrate a claim against the manufacturer? What if the
customer buys the product via mail order? Is a written arbitra-
tion clause contained in the shipping box binding on the pur-
chaser? When a diner in a restaurant receives a check that
contains an arbitration clause on the back, is the diner con-
fined to arbitration if ptomaine or salmonella strike?
The average person's initial reaction to these suggestions
is likely to be that this parade of horribles conjures the ridicu-
lous. Perhaps. I hope so. But judicial treatment of consent
issues found in securities arbitration and other arbitration
contexts in recent years suggests no readily apparent means of
distinguishing current application of the Federal Arbitration
Act from the hypotheticals outlined above.
By drifting away from, or perhaps abandoning altogether,
society's traditional notions of meaningful consent, the judicia-
ry has slouched toward a Gomorrah of enforcing agreements
that appear to lack real consent. This should raise at least as
much concern for us as the licentiousness of Gomorrah seems
to raise for Judge Bork and other conservatives. Although
some may disagree, I find the erosion of the role of consent in
contract law at least as troubling as the nonviolent evils of
Gomorrah. A legal system that glosses over serious questions
of consent in its contract and dispute resolution jurisprudence
reduces its claim to legitimacy and begins to look less like the
Anglo-American system we have been raised to revere and
more like totalitarian or other systems which place little em-
phasis on individual rights.
One might well accuse the American judiciary of having
taken both the low road of neglect and slouching, as well as
the more ambitious path of bootstrapping toward Gomorrah. In
its zeal to expand the availability to compulsory arbitration as
a partial solution to a perceived litigation caseload crisis, the
Supreme Court has labored mightily to interpret the 1926
Federal Arbitration Act9 in an evolutionary manner that has
expanded the scope and power of the Act.1" Much of the fruit
of this effort has benefitted the judicial system and the Ameri-
' See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1994) (first enacted in 1926).
10 See infra pp. 1415-26.
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can public by eliminating erroneously constructed barriers to,
or prejudices toward, arbitration. The largest beneficiaries ap-
pear, however, to be America's business elite, particularly the
securities industry. Irrespective of the distributive consequenc-
es, there is no denying that the expansion of arbitration has
been substantially fueled not only through the rejection of sus-
pect precedents" but also through reinterpretation of the Act
via a more flexible and evolutive form of statutory interpreta-
tion to which many judges and Justices claim not to sub-
scribe.
12
In a sense, the Court has employed an evolutive, purposive
and goal oriented mode of statutory interpretation ostensibly
eschewed by many members of the Court and thus has "boot-
strapped" arbitration into a position of greater prominence. In
its rush to empower arbitration, the Court has overlooked
traditional bedrock values of our legal system: consent, uncon-
scionability, disclosure, fairness and federalism. Worse yet, in
defending the beachhead of the new arbitration established by
dynamic statutory interpretation, the Court and lower courts
have frequently relied on a formalist and hypertechnical form
of statutory interpretation totally at odds with the flexible,
policy oriented approach utilized to expand arbitration. This
inconsistent approach has, among other things, reduced con-
sent to a mere legal fiction, a shadow of its former self.13
" See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration
Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259 (1991) [hereinafter Pitfalls] (criticizing inchoate
.public policy" reservations about arbitration and generally approving move away
from precedents restricting enforcement of arbitration clauses on public policy
grounds).
"2 For example, Former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger was generally regarded
as a judicial conservative disinclined to increase the scope of legislation by giving
broad or judicially expanded construction to statutes. However, he authored the
majority opinion in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), a key case that
dramatically expanded the reach of the Federal Arbitration Act by construing the
statute to create substantive federal law applicable in state as well as federal
courts. Current Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist is generally regarded not only
as a judicial conservative but also an originalist and a textualist in matters of
statutory interpretation. A Justice employing this philosophy will enforce the liter-
al language of a statute but prefers not to expand statutory reach beyond the
specific intent of the enacting legislature. But Chief Justice Rehnquist has, with
only modest exception, supported the Court's modem, judicially driven expansion of
the Act, as has Justice Antonin Scalia, another Justice commonly associated with
textualist and originalist values. See infra pp. 1417-28.
3 See Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither
[Vol. 62:13811386
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Although Professor Speidel's paper is even in approach
and emphasis, the reader cannot help but sense that he has
tacitly accepted the view that reflective, case-by-case adjudica-
tion of consent has become a luxury that the American judicial
system either cannot afford or will not support. He concludes
his insightful analysis with the disturbing peroration that
it is unlikely that informed consent, bargaining and realistic market
opportunities can be easily restored, the answer points toward a
more overtly public system of dispute resolution in the securities
industry. That system, which has yet to be designed, can require
informed consent but cannot rely upon consent as a primary method
of regulating the federal contract to arbitration."
Although one realizes that Professor Speidel continues to har-
bor a warm spot in his legal heart for consent, his legal cere-
brum thinks modern relative preferences and sociopolitical
reality require that arbitral fairness be pursued through regu-
lation rather than any serious effort to resuscitate a meaning-
ful approach to consent.
It is quite possible, of course, that Professor Speidel is
correct. If the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, apply a
wooden, Lochnerized version of contracting" to issues of
arbitrability, superficial remnants of the consent paradigm are
of little value. Better to retreat from the consent battlefield
altogether and regroup to seek substantive regulation.
Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1335, 1338 (1996) [hereinafter Whither Consent?]
(characterizing as 'clearly correct" Dean Joel Seligman's assessment that "consent
in securities arbitration [is] a 'legal fiction' and that 'mandatory arbitration' (is] a
more accurate characterization." Id- at 1388 (quoting Joel Seligman, The Quiet
Revolution: Securities Arbitration Confronts the Hard Questions, 33 HoUS. L. REV.
327, 330 (1996)).
14 See Speidel, Whither Consent?, supra note 13, at 1362-63.
15 The Court's contract jurisprudence has been criticized as advocating an unre-
alistic model of alleged freedom of contract and limited government involvement
reminiscent of the "Lochner era," so named for the Court's decision in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which struck down a state wage and hour regula-
tion as impermissibly interfering with freedom of contract. The result in Lochner
probably was not cheered by the 80-hour-per-week employees whose "freedom" was
upheld by the Court to override the legislature's attempt to protect them from
sweatshop working conditions. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux The
Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the Federal Common Law of Employee
Benefits, 56 OHIo ST. L.J. 153 (1995); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern
Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 433, 436 (1993) (stating that the Court's notions
of contract are part of sweeping, "even radical, pro-market jurisprudence'.
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I do not dispute Professor Speidel or others who support
substantial government regulation of the arbitral process. The
American disputing system requires substantial government
standard-setting and policing of dispute resolution. The more
disputes are resolved apart from courts and other government
agencies, the more government needs to regulate those dis-
putes to ensure the basic integrity of both disputing processes
and outcomes. Although the presumptive government stance
should be one of noninterference with private agreements,
some baseline of control to ensure fairness is required. More
arbitration and ADR may mean less government provision of
traditional adjudication, but it does not mean less government
involvement. Rather, the ADR revolution implies a different
type of government involvement that avoids hamhanded med-
dling in the arbitral process but provides basic guarantees of
justice and a means for enforcing them.16
One can have both a judiciary meaningfully committed to
consent jurisprudence and a set of regulations designed to
achieve desired substantive policy for parties who consent to
dispute via arbitration rather than litigation. The two concepts
are inconsistent only if the nation adopts a public policy that
prefers arbitration far more than it prefers consent.17 To the
"6 To the extent that arbitration (or any other ADR method) becomes an exter-
nally imposed system replacing civil litigation, it cannot truly be considered the
sort of private ordering that should fully or nearly fully replace government ad-
ministration. For example, a multilateral arbitration agreement among similarly
situated entities (e.g., a mythical "Alliance for Insurance Coverage Apportionment")
would probably qualify as the type of truly consensual, mutually beneficial, effi-
cient effort to resolve disputes with a minimum of government entanglements that
constitutes the sort of "private ordering" that actually transplants the prior govern-
ment-operated status quo. For example, insurers unable to resolve disputes over
allocation or apportionment of insurance benefits are faced with the prospect of
litigating these issues in both state and federal courts, with the outcomes con-
trolled by the 50 different state laws on the subject, with substantial expenses in
legal fees and pretrial fact development. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETA-
TION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 3.4 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (discussing issues of
insurance coverage and allocation among multiple insurers with coverage responsi-
bilities).
At virtually the other end of the spectrum from the consensual industry
agreement hypothesized above is modem American securities arbitration, which
results not from any consensus among the affected contracting parties but from
one party's imposition of an alternative system on the other parties to their con-
tracts.
7 As one commentator observed, our legal system values contract law because
"we value the consent and the autonomy it presupposes. However, we do not have
[Vol. 62:13811388
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extent one can find any fault in Professor Speidel's assessment,
it is that he arguably throws consent overboard too quickly in
order to attempt to keep substantive justice afloat. A revived
consent jurisprudence and substantive regulation of arbitration
both are essential ingredients to achieving and maintaining
justice in ADR.'5
I. THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF CONSENT
Although the judicial developments reviewed by Professor
Speidel suggest that courts have jettisoned the concept of con-
sent from the judicial lexicon, attempts to relegate consent to
the dustbin of either contract or ADR law are misguided. For a
variety of reasons, consent remains a vital part of the law even
if federal courts today seem to have forgotten this essential
truth. Consent offers several distinct benefits if meaningfully
incorporated with modern arbitration jurisprudence.
A. Consent as the Basis for the Constitutionality of Arbitration
The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution preserves for
litigants a right to a jury trial in actions at law.' The right to
a jury trial does not attach for equitable actions, but in cases
presenting claims for both legal and equitable relief a right to
autonomy and consent because of contract; it is the other way around-we have
contract because we value autonomy and consent.' Dennis Patterson, Good Faith in
Tort and Contract Law: A Comment, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1994) (emphasis
added). Professor Patterson appears to use the term 'consent" as necessarily re-
quiring that the activity be volitional to be consensual. Unfortunately, too many
lawyers, judges and politicians appear to have forgotten this simple but elegant
truth. In this Comment, I am also using consent as a broad term meaning volun-
tary agreement. But see Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability, supra note 8
(suggesting distinction between voluntary consent given without reservation and
involuntary consent given grudgingly).
18 I generally support the ADR expansion of the past quarter century, viewed
arbitration positively when in private practice, and have served as an arbitrator.
But because my association with arbitration has been both actual and theoretical,
I harbor few illusions. If arbitration continues to be imposed without meaningful
consent or is inadequately policed by the judiciary, injustice will result.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. VII specifically states:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the Unit-
ed States, than according to the rules of the common law.
1389
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a jury trial exists for common questions of fact.2" Although
many modern statutes and claims did not exist in 1791, the
Amendment has been interpreted to require a jury trial of
statutory claims seeking monetary damages, the classic form of
legal relief, so long as there is a relatively apt analogy between
the modern statutory claim and a historical action for damag-
es.2' A limited rejection of the right to jury trial exists for
statutory matters distinct from common law actions and de-
signed to vindicate "public rights" rather than private
claims.22 Historically, courts conducting essentially equitable
20 See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (Seventh Amend-
ment prohibits court from conducting bench trial of equitable claims prior to jury
trial of legal claims in case where judge's factual determinations will create issue
preclusion of the jury-triable claims). The Beacon Theatres holding was something
of a breakthrough decision that operated to expand the right to a jury trial at
least as much as to preserve it, because the 1938 merger of law and equity in the
Federal Civil Rules as interpreted in Beacon Theatres operated to ensure that
henceforth juries would make findings of fact in what had previously been regard-
ed as equitable matters tried solely to the court. See id. at 515 (Stewart, J., with
Harlan and Whitaker, JJ., dissenting on ground majority holding expands jury
trial right rather than "preserving" it as required by Seventh Amendment). But see
John McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon
Theatres v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1967) (praising Beacon Theatres
as a good example of construing Constitution as flexible document for evolving
society).
Despite its arguably revolutionary status, Beacon Theatres remains good law
and has been repeatedly affirmed by the Court. See, e.g., Lytle v. Household Mfg.,
Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 550 (1990) (The Court applied Beacon Theatres and Dairy
Queen to require jury trial of erroneously dismissed § 1981 claim and prohibited
issue preclusion of common fact determinations based on bench trial of (then equi-
table) Title VII claim.); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (holding
that in action involving franchisor's claim for equitable accounting and franchisee's
legal claim for antitrust damages, bench trial of accounting prior to antitrust claim
violates Seventh Amendment).
2 See, e.g., Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565-66 (1990)
(jury trial required for worker's claim against union for breach of duty of fair
representation although appropriate characterization of historical analogy is at best
unclear); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 420 (1987) (jury trial required in
government action seeking civil penalties for wetlands degradation); Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974) (private action pursuant to fair housing provi-
sions of Civil Rights Act of 1968 requiring jury trial in part because of historical
analogy to innkeeper's common law duty to receive paying lodgers irrespective of
race or national origin); see generally Charles Wolfram, The Constitutional History
of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973).
2 See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450 (1977) (Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Con-
gress from establishing statutory claims or duties and designating administrative
agency as factfinder where statutory scheme seeks to establish and protect public
1390 [Vol. 62:1381
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proceedings possessed some power to resolve disputed facts
through a bench trial as part of the effort to "cie-an-up" resolu-
tion of the matter even if the facts decided touch on a legal
claim.' However, this exception and some of its precedents
have been constricted by modern decisions."4
Applied to the typical securities dispute, the Seventh
Amendment ordinarily provides a clear default rule in favor of
jury trial upon demand of any party.' Consequently, claims
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 would ordinarily be
subject to jury trial.' Starting at ground zero, investors pos-
sess a seventh amendment right to jury trial in claims against
their brokers and vice versa. Because the jury trial right in
these cases is constitutional, it cannot be abrogated by legisla-
tive enactment, executive order, widely held reservations about
juries or enthusiasm for alternative dispute resolution. Only
actions by the parties, such as a waiver of the right to jury
trial27 or a desire to substitute some other proceeding in lieu
of jury trial, can divest a disputant of seventh amendment
rights.
rights rather than to create private right of recovery).
' See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 337 (1966) (Seventh Amendment does
not require jury trial where trustee sues former creditor to recover payments made
by alleged voidable preference).
21 See Granfinanciera, S. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 36 (1989) (business that
has not submitted claim against bankruptcy estate may insist upon jury trial
when sued by trustee for receiving allegedly preferential transfer;, Katchen u.
Landy precedent permitting court determination of some legal issues construed
narrowly and arguably overruled).
' See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1970) (Seventh Amend-
ment requires jury trial of shareholder's derivative suit raising allegations under
Investment Company Act of 1940); SEC v. Associated Minerals, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 724
(E.D. Mich. 1977) (party bringing claims under Securities Act of 1933 has seventh
amendment right to jury trial where relief sought is legal rather than equitable).
"s See, e.g., Service Group, Inc. v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 379, 382 (D. Del.
1977) (jury trial required for damage claims under 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
This principle is so well established that there are literally no cases dated after
1977 in the Civil Procedure volume (Rule 38) of the United States Code Annotat-
ed. Since 1977, the Supreme Court has, in general, acted to expand rather than
contract seventh amendment rights. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d) ("Failure of a party to serve and file a de-
mand [for jury trial) as required by this rule constitutes a waiver by the party of
trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be
withdrawn without the consent of the parties.").
28 See, e.g., In re Balsam Corp., 185 B.R. 54, 58 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (parties can
by agreement abrogate right to jury trial).
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It follows, of course, that claims are arbitrable only when
the disputants have evidenced sufficient consent to arbitration
to overcome seventh amendment concerns. This axiom is both
simple and seemingly overlooked or underappreciated in the
modern ADR debate. The oversight probably results from the
judicial tendency to find consent upon the slimmest of reeds.29
Although a serious examination of consent in some of
these cases could have resulted in a finding of sufficient con-
sent, it is more than a little disturbing that the Court seems
unwilling to make a sustained examination of consent issues.
The Court's disinterest in consent issues is disturbing enough.
Its refusal to apply a realistic notion of consent is shameful."
See Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV.
81, 107-10 (1992): Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28
UCLA L. REV. 478, 512-63 (1981) (generally prevailing contract law finds waiver
on the basis of external indicia of acceptance of transaction rather than requiring
specific proof of voluntary and knowledgeable choice among actually existing alter-
natives). For example, the Supreme Court has expressly or implicitly found ade-
quate consent in a variety of suspicious circumstances. Perhaps most infamously,
an employee is found to have consented to arbitrate and forgo constitutional rights
on the basis of executing forms required as a condition of work. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Co., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (broker required to sign New York
Stock Exchange form agreeing to arbitrate any disputes arising out of employment
held to agreement without serious analysis of consent issue; application of § 1 of
the Federal Arbitration Act, which provides that Act does not apply to contract of
employment, and rejecting claim). Vacationers have been held to forum selection
clauses printed on the back of ocean liner tickets. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise
Lines, Ltd., 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (Washington State residents required to bring
claim for personal injuries arising out of ocean liner vacation in Florida due to
choice of forum language in small print on back of tickets received after purchase
and shortly before departure). Disabled vessels have been bound by the forum
selection clauses in the form contract signed as a condition of obtaining a tow for
the drifting vessel. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). Fran-
chisees have been held to arbitration provisions in franchise agreements without
any serious focus on issues of consent. See, e.g., Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996) (Subway sandwich shop franchisee subject to
arbitration clause despite state law requiring disclosure of arbitration provisions);
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth v. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (automobile dealer
required to arbitrate due to clause required by manufacturer as a condition of
relationship).
"0 How many of us "agree" to whatever is on the back of a ticket stub or a
parking lot sign? How many of us are willing to risk losing a promised job when
the employer at the last minute requests/demands execution of an arbitration
agreement in conjunction with the W-4 Form? Fortunately, not all courts are as
blind to this concrete problem as is the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995)
(arbitration clause signed by securities industry worker unenforceable in Title VII
claim in light of context of execution of agreement; arbitration form rushed by
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There are troubling consent issues lurking at the periphery of
arbitrability decisions. Although a sustained examination may
result in defensible enforcement of these arbitration clauses,
the Court's sweeping away of consent considerations truncates
analysis and robs the case law of content it should contain: i.e.,
what should the law require by way of consent to make for an
enforceable agreement, and does the standard vary according
the stakes of the case?
Because, as Professor Speidel has noted, we have moved
toward a system of mandatory arbitration where consent is
treated as a mere legal fiction, arbitrability case law lacks
serious consent analysis. But without consent the entire edifice
of enforcement of arbitration agreements falls before the Sev-
enth Amendment. Although the current Court is unlikely to
have a vision of consent on its arbitral road to Damascus or
Gomorroh, this should provide limited comfort even to arbitra-
tion proponents. Were the Court to become more seriously
focused on consent, entire arbitration systems might in the
future be invalidated for failure to obtain meaningful consent
of the contracting parties. A shift in judicial thinking might
invalidate entire regimes of arbitration erected during the
Court's current obliviousness to consent issues. In addition,
arbitration under these circumstances will remain politically
suspect and more ripe for extensive regulation to the extent it
is imposed by fiat or duress-like leverage without disclosure
and consent.
employee told to sign document as mere formality). But see Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing arbitration clause packed in comput-
er shipment).
Professor Ware criticizes Lai for tacitly making the right to litigate employ-
ment disputes less alienable than other rights. See Ware, Arbitration and Uncon-
scionability, supra note 8. I disagree to some extent in that the Lai focus is on
actual consent rather than ostensible consent. The Lai approach should be the
norm for policing all contracts, not only arbitration agreements, although mutual
consent can be proven by outward acts. In addition, even if Professor Ware's as-
sessment is correct, courts should impose a more searching standard of inquiry
where the right allegedly waived potentially implicates the party's ability to en-
force a host of other rights. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DFMOCRACY AND DIS-
TRusT (1981) (arguing for limited judicial intervention in policing law except where
structural barriers prevent political process from adequately considering claims of
entity challenging law).
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B. Prudential Reasons for Retaining a Vigorous Concept of
Consent
Although the Seventh Amendment raises additional con-
cerns and makes for a massive system of mandated arbitration
built on feet of clay, the constitutional concerns about enforced
arbitration are but one reason to insist that courts take the
issue of arbitral consent seriously. A number of prudential
concerns flowing from contract law, litigation procedure and
jurisprudence also counsel continuing concern for consent.
1. Emphasizing Consent Is Most Consistent with
Contract Law
For the most part, contract is about consent. The concept
of contract is best explained by notions of consent, and contract
law is most legitimately supported by consent. 1 Although
consent based contract theory has been debated as excessively
libertarian," such attacks are misguided," even if one finds
" See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 269
(1986). Professor Barnett identifies five major traditional theories (will, reliance,
efficiency, substantive fairness and bargain) underlying contract law and finds all
to fail in some significant way at explaining or organizing contract law. He finds,
persuasively in my view, that a consent based contract theory possesses both
greater explanatory power and a more attractive normative underpinning for con-
tract law. See Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1022 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default
Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992); Randy E. Barnett,
Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1969
(1987).
' See, e.g., Amy H. Kastely, Cogs or Cyborgs?: Blasphemy and Irony in Con-
tract Theories, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 132, 149-51 (1995).
For example, Professor Kastely's attack on Professor Barnett misses the
mark by pulling from the context of his consent theory article a specific illustra-
tion, which is then attacked, assertedly for taking a position Professor Barnett
seems to me not to have endorsed, and then labeling "absurd" the conclusions
Barnett did not reach. See Kastely, supra note 32, at 150-51. Most distressingly,
Professor Barnett's consent theory is portrayed as more libertarian than a fair
reading permits. A more balanced view treats Barnett-style consent theory as both
libertarian and "formalist" while also emphasizing the protective, almost paternal-
istic nature of consent theory in protecting individuals' "freedom from contract."
See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Afterword: The Shifting Domain of Contract, 90 NW.
U. L. REV. 254, 262-63 (1995) [hereinafter Afterword]. However, even if Professor
Barnett's vision of a consent theory is largely libertarian, it does not follow that
the consent basis of contract is strictly libertarian. Requiring consent as a prereq-
uisite to legal enforcement seems at least as communitarian as it is libertarian.
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consent insufficient to provide the overarching theory of con-
tract.' Although one might argue that other aspects of con-
tract-bargain, reliance, promise, efficiency, mobility of resourc-
es, etc.-are more central to contract, no serious observer can
deny that consent and assent at least lie near the core of con-
tractual values. Even if consent is not sufficient to support a
theory, it remains a most important criterion for determining
the validity and scope of contracts. One need not be particular-
ly libertarian to appreciate the importance of consent.'
To the extent that contracts generally rest in large part on
consent, it is at least equally true that consent is central to the
arbitration contract, which touches more closely on fundamen-
tal values of civic rights and access to the courts than does the
average contract. In the absence of an agreement indicating
consent to arbitrate disputes, the "default rule" is civil litiga-
tion in courts of general jurisdiction. Subject to limits of illegal-
ity or unconscionability, parties may generally make a volun-
tary agreement to contract out of default rules and into some-
thing else. The key word, of course, is voluntary. Involuntary
agreements are not, generally spealng, enforceable contracts.
Voluntarism presumes consent, although both voluntarism and
consent may be found constructively and under circumstances
where the consent is grudging, if sufficiently informed and
noncoercive. An agreement lacking at least minimal indicia of
informed consent is really not a contract and ordinarily does
not deserve enforcement.
Arbitration contracts are particularly problematic, as Pro-
fessor Speidel has noted previously:
[Tihe alternative dispute resolution (ADR) phenomenon requires a
very close look. A mediated or agreed settlement and a final arbitra-
Mfore specifically, even if one accepts the standard view that "intent" is irrelevant
so long as the buyer has an opportunity to review adhesion contract terms, the
credit card, boat ticket, shrink wrap, and packaging cases are wrongly decided
because the inadequate opportunity for review precludes even constructive consent.
See supra notes 8, 29-31; Speidel, Whither Consent?, supra note 13, at 1350 n.58.
" See generally Todd Rakoff, Too Many Theories, 94 MICH. L REv. 1799 (1996)
(contract scholars have been excessively entrepreneurial in advancing preferred
unifying theories of contract with little benefit to our actual understanding of
contract).
" At bottom, the consent criterion in contract stems from the simple notion
that people should keep their promises but not be legally constrained by promises
they did not truly make.
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tion award resolve disputes with finality. Although the process of
settlement or award may be reviewed, the merits are normally insu-
lated. The pro-ADR rhetoric is strong and, frequently, justice be-
tween the parties is done. Where these outcomes are beyond the
scope of regulatory law and no third party interests are involved,
the process can and should be defended. But there is a potential
dark side to ADR, especially where regulated organizations are able
to insist upon arbitration to resolve all claims arising from or relat-
ing to a contract, including statutory and punitive damage claims
against them. 6
Having noted the "dark side" of arbitration in this Symposium
and in his prior work, Professor Speidel urges substantive
regulation as the means for controlling the arbitral beast, too
quickly eschewing a role for serious consent based scrutiny by
the courts. If arbitration is to continue as a contract driven
mode of ADR, it must be adjudicated with ample respect for
the importance of consent in contract law.
2. Deferring to Experience: A Burkean37 Perspective on
Consent
As noted above, consent is and has long been at least a
major underpinning of Anglo-American contract doctrine even
if it is not the major underpinning of contract. Furthermore,
courts have for some time been in the business of adjudicating
contracts on the basis of consent, assent, voluntarism and
fairness as well as text and evidence of bargaining.38 Even
36 Speidel, Afterword, supra note 33, at 265.
'7 By 'Burkean," I mean a conservative perspective reluctant to depart from
traditional values and activity unless those advocating change have made a highly
convincing case for change. Edmund Burke, the paradigmatic form of this sort of
conservative, placed a high value on success proven by experience and was
skeptical of reformers who merely hypothesized that the traditional means of
organizing society could be improved upon in light of tradition's past effectiveness.
See BAILEY KUxLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAw 55-56
(1994).
36 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS chs. 1-3 (2d ed. 1990) (viewing prom-
ise and assent, both of which involve consent, as central to contract, but recogniz-
ing that courts find enforceable assent even where resisting party claims to have
lacked complete appreciation of agreement or equal bargaining power); Jean
Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 49, 58-60 (1995) (early
twentieth century contract law guru Samuel Williston, although painted as a for-
malist supporter of laissez-faire notions, supported judicial policing of contracts on
bases of both consent and public policy); Robert A. Hillman, The Triumph of
Gilmore's The Death of Contract, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 32, 33-34 (1995) (Nineteenth
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though these tools may have fallen from fashion in the modern
Supreme Court, there is no persuasive reason for abandoning
them. At a minimum, then, there is a strong argument for
retaining consent as a fulcrum of our contract jurisprudence
simply because it is the status quo-or at least was until the
last few years of the Court's slouching. Quite frankly, the issue
of arbitrability tests whether current conservatives on the
bench are "Edmund Burke Conservatives" who resist changes
in law and society absent a compelling reason or what might
be termed "J.P. Morgan Conservatives" who embrace whatever
legal and social goals are sought by commercial interest
groups.39
Put in Burkean terms, the issue becomes whether arbitra-
tion partisans have advanced any compelling reason to remove
consent from the arbitrability equation. No such case has been
made. Arguments for enforcement of boilerplate arbitration
agreements follow the simplistic view that the existence of a
written arbitration agreement presumes consent irrespective of
the actual context of the transaction. Beyond this, arbitration
proponents make the theoretical argument that the availability
of enforced arbitration without significant burdens of bargain,
disclosure or consent will enable industry to offer products or
services at a lower cost. This pseudo-empirical argument for
enforced arbitration as efficiency suffers from two defects: (1)
there is no evidence to suggest any reduction in price flows
from enforced arbitration;" and (2) there is no compelling
century Harvard Law School Dean Christopher Columbus LangdeU's theory of
contract, although frequently criticized as formalist and too supportive of laissez-
faire social forces, has at its heart a "bargain theory of consideration" which rests
on presupposition of agreement to make and abide by bargain; when incorporated
into Oliver Wendell Holmes's objective theory of contract, bargain theory took on
more free-market overtones.); Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual
Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75
Nw. U. L. REV. 1018, 1041 (1981) (contracts are formed through incremental pro-
cess of agreement); Edward L. Rubin, The Nonjudicial Life of Contract- Beyond the
Shadow of the Law, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 107, 113 (1995) (traditional values of con-
tract law and concerns about party conduct and agreement submerged in part be-
cause during 1970s "the entire field, under [Seventh Circuit Judge and University
of Chicago Law Professor Richard A. Posner's influence], took a massive wrong
turn" focusing on economic efficiency of contract and common law adjudication
rather than values other than efficiency and behavior outside courts).
39 See KUKLiN & STMIPEL, supra note 37, at 53-59 (describing leading political
philosophers with influence on law and summarizing Burke's view).
" Although consumer prices may not have been reduced by arbitration, busi-
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normative argument that the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency posited
by arbitration's cheerleaders, even if achieved, is more impor-
tant than protecting the rights of a contract party that did not
consent.4
In short, traditional contract law reflects the common
sense intuition that society values some things more than
lower costs, efficiency or greater aggregate wealth. Default
rules and systems reflect a socio-legal judgment as to what
should occur in the absence of agreement. Where a default
litigation system is supplanted by arbitration, some relatively
reliable indicia of agreement to the substitution is logically re-
quired. Consent is logically required. If courts insist on ade-
quate consent, there is far less need to "litigationize" arbitra-
ness profits may have been enhanced (although even this article of faith among
arbitration proponents has no solid empirical support). But an increase in business
profit, although hardly a bad thing, is not the promised consumer benefit that has
been used to "sell" arbitration to courts and legislators.
1 For example, in the Badie v. Bank of America litigation, University of Vir-
ginia Law School Dean Robert Scott testified as an expert witness for the bank,
which had added an arbitration clause in its credit card agreements via an insert
to regular customer monthly billings. Continued use of the credit card was to
constitute consent to the new arbitration provision. According to Dean Scott, cre-
ation of an enforceable arbitration clause through this attenuated method of con-
tracting vindicated the public interest because it would enable the bank to offer
credit card services at a lower fee or interest charges. This view is fine in theory,
but it appears that neither Dean Scott nor any other bank witness introduced any
evidence of a reduction in charges accompanying the bank's switch to arbitration
nor any evidence of price reductions wrought through other mandatory arbitration
programs. Notwithstanding the absence of empirical proof, the court, beguiled by
the theoretical gains, ruled the bank's "arbitration by junk mail" contract
enforceable. See Badie v. Bank of America, No. 94-4916, 1994 WL 660730, at *1
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994).
Moreover, even a world of lower aggregate prices does not in itself support a
rejection of consent in contract law. Put differently, should even a relatively small
group of people be directed toward a dispute resolution forum not of their choosing
simply because this may lower the interest rate on the unpaid balance of a credit
card by one-tenth of one percent? In the specific context of securities arbitration,
the potential trade-off is starker still. Should even a relatively small number of
investors be forced to arbitrate unwittingly or without promise or assent in return
for at best marginal savings in commission expenses? If arbitration results in
reduced detection and punishment of fraud, churning or unduly risky broker be-
havior, the trade-off becomes a poor one irrespective of the aggregate savings to
consumers as a whole, the majority of whom are not defrauded by even the most
corrupt of industries. See Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type H Error, and the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 AIZ. L. REv. 711, 714 (1996) (costs of
even a small increase in securities fraud dwarf any savings from reducing proce-
dural expenses in view of sheer size of American capital markets).
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tion.' Furthermore, for some claims the judicial mechanisms
for assessing truth are more likely to be effective than those of
arbitration.' In these classes of cases, courts should insist on
a high quality of consent as a prerequisite to enforcing arbitra-
tion agreements.
In addition, the notion of consent is central to much of our
jurisprudence. Our litigation system is an adversarial one
premised on disputants retaining counsel. In civil and even
criminal litigation, disputants can do much to shape the con-
duct and outcome of litigation through consent: waiver, stipula-
tions, and settlement (partial or complete). Edting of the sys-
tem via consensual settlement is permitted even on the meta-
phorical steps of the Supreme Court." But even in this arena
of sharpened adversity, where the parties ordinarily have
counsel and are acutely aware of the dangers of being held to a
constructive agreement through failure to speak or act deci-
sively, courts ordinarily require some meaningful degree of
consent before attaching legal consequences.
3. Consent, Judicial Competence and Improving Arbitra-
bility Adjudications
A more vigorous consent regime of arbitrability holds po-
tential to provide procedural and other adjudication advantag-
es over the current practice of mandatory arbitration.
a. A consent paradigm for arbitration is articulable, feasible
and affordable.
One ground for ejecting consent from the arbitrability
branch of contract law posits that serious attention to consent
42 See Bruce M. Selya, Arbitration Unbound?: The Legacy of McMiahon, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1433, 1445-46 (1996) (criticizing increasing formalization of arbitra-
tion procedures as negating speed, cost and efficiency advantages traditionally
enjoyed by arbitration over litigation).
" See Selya, supra note 42, at 1456-57 (suggesting that courts are more com-
petent to determine discrimination claims but no better than arbitration panels for
assessing securities disputes).
"See, e.g., Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979) (parties settle antitrust dispute with peti-
tion for certiorari pending, leading to dispute over apt fee owed petitioner's coun-
sel under unusual contingency fee agreement).
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issues interjects too much unpredictability and subjectivity,
thereby undermining the Federal Arbitration Act45 and its
attendant national policy.4 6 The charge is at best overstated.
4' This argument has not been stated quite this openly in arbitrability litiga-
tion or adjudication but is discernable in the Court's tendency to resist serious
inquiry regarding consent issues in arbitrability cases. Even when the Court holds
an arbitration clause unenforceable, it tends to do so based only on formal or
superficial reasons rather than a full contextual inquiry into the agreement.
For example, in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920
(1995), the Court refused to require the Kaplans to arbitrate although they had
guaranteed the commodity trading obligations of a company they controlled, which
had entered into an arbitration agreement. The Court's reasoning: the Kaplans
individually were different entities from their company, the entity that signed the
arbitration agreement and that was that. Id. at 1928-30. Although this may have
been the right result and certainly is in part a welcome tip of the judicial hat
toward consent, it is nonetheless a suboptimal arbitration decision. A serious in-
quiry would have examined whether in the context of the transaction the Kaplans
as personal guarantors of a closely held company they owned reasonably expected
any commodity trading disputes to be resolved in an arbitration proceeding.
In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1216
(1995), the Court essentially decided that investors should not be held to the un-
fairly surprising terms of a choice of law agreement in a securities brokerage
contract providing for arbitration where the chosen law, that of New York, was
unusual in its prohibition against arbitrators awarding punitive damages no mat-
ter how egregious a defendant's conduct. But even Mastrobuono, by far the best of
the Court's recent arbitration decisions, was decided on the basis of rough theoriz-
ing about the matter-positing that the Mastrobuonos, academics, were insuffi-
ciently sophisticated to appreciate the limitations of New York remedies
law-rather than any actual inquiry as to the intent, understanding and agree-
ment of the parties to the contract.
46 See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24-25 (1983):
[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration . . . . The Arbitration Act estab-
lishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether
the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or
an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.
See also Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 660 (1996) (iden-
tifying Moses H. Cone as initial case placing Court on record as favoring arbitra-
tion as a matter of national policy).
Professor Sternlight's assessment is perhaps overstated in two facets, however.
First, the Court's interpretation of the Act as an endorsement of arbitration as
well as a statute mandating an end to discrimination against arbitration as a
matter of contract enforcement can be seen at least tacitly in cases such as the
1960 Steelworker's Trilogy, even though these were labor arbitration cases and the
Court's enthusiasm for labor arbitration predates its embrace of commercial arbi-
tration. The Steelworker's Trilogy consists of United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
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The Act reflects a national policy of enforcing arbitration
agreements. It does not reflect a national policy in favor of
arbitration over litigation or any other form of dispute resolu-
tion. The intent of the Arbitration Act was to override a judge-
made rule refusing to give specific enforcement to predispute
arbitration agreements.4 ' A proper application of the Act
would preserve traditional contract doctrine, including the con-
sent concept." Reviewing, enforcing, and policing arbitration
363 U.S. 593 (1960).
Second, Moses H. Cone and its progeny have emphasized that the perceived
national policy favoring arbitration mandates a deferential view of the scope of an
arbitration agreement but not necessarily a similarly relaxed notion of consent.
See, e.g., AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communication Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643
(1986) (refusing to compel arbitration of particular work dispute where particular
type of dispute is not mentioned on face of labor arbitration agreement). The in-
sidiousness of the Court's consent jurisprudence has not been its express rejection
of the consent concept, but rather the implicit rejection of consent through a hair
trigger tendency to deem an arbitration agreement consensual under even the
most coercive circumstances.
47 See IAN R. MACNEIL, AhMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION; NATIONAL-
IZATION; INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992) [hereinafter AmERICAN ARBITRATION Lw]
(reviewing origins and enactment of the Act; chapter 9, Analysis of Legislative His.
tory, is particularly focused on the intent of the Act as passed); Stempel, The
Employment Exclusion, supra note 7, at 288-93.
The House Judiciary Committee stated the following with regard to the Act:
"The bill declares that such agreements shall be recognized and enforced by the
courts of the United States." H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Congress, 1st Sess. (1926)
(quoted in MACNEIL, supra, at 117). Nothing is said to suggest that the Act in any
way disturbs normal tenets of contract law. Rather, the Act appears an effort to
require federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements that meet the standards
by which other contracts are enforced by federal courts. See Stempel, Pitfalls,
supra note 11, at 271-74 (prior to Act, federal courts and many state courts exhib-
ited jealousy of jurisdiction and refusal to enforce arbitration agreements merely
because this would divert dispute to nonjudicial forum).
"8 As Professor Sternlight observes:
The practice of interpreting ambiguities to favor arbitration, which the
Court first enunciated in Moses H. Cone in 1983, is nothing less than a
means of spreading binding arbitration by Supreme Court fiat. Some
courts have used this interpretive power boldly to require consumers,
employees and others who likely had no idea arbitration would be rele-
vant to a given issue to submit the problem to arbitration. However, no
policy supports the Court's practice of interpreting an ambiguous arbitra-
tion agreement any differently from any other ambiguous contract ....
Congress never authorized the Court to put its thumb on the scale to
favor arbitration in the commercial or consumer context, and such bias
also lacks support as a matter of policy.
Sternlight, supra note 46, at 704-05 (footnotes omitted); see supra note 46 (sug-
gesting Court's expansion of Act to create national policy favoring arbitration rath-
er than merely commanding courts not to discriminate against arbitration con-
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agreements according to the quality of consent evidenced in
the matter admits of workable judicial standards.49
tracts predates Moses H. Cone).
41 In particular, through the application of traditional adjudication, courts could
ensure that arbitration agreements qualify as enforceable contracts meeting the
consent criterion. Written agreements to arbitrate would be treated as presump-
tively enforceable, but the presumption would be rebuttable upon a showing of any
of the following:
(1) Blameless Ignorance. [The party resisting arbitration] was not ade-
quately aware of the arbitration clause or the nature of arbitration as
opposed to litigation, made reasonable efforts to acquire sufficient aware-
ness, and would not have consented to a contract with the instant arbi-
tration clause if aware of the differences between arbitration and litiga-
tion;
(2) Dirty-Dealing. The arbitration agreement or the contract as a whole
was procured through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion and the ob-
jecting party cannot be said to have constructively consented to arbitra-
tion;
(3) Inescapable Adhesion. The arbitration clause is part of a contract of
adhesion and the subject matter of the contract is vital to contemporary
human existence, similar to those things that the law of contracting by
minors has traditionally labeled as "necessary," and [the party resisting
arbitration] had no reasonable means of obtaining the good or service or
its substantial equivalent from another source;
(4) Substantive Unonscionability. The arbitration forum, system, or cho-
sen process decreed by the clause is so unreasonably favorable to the
drafter as to be substantively unconscionable [such] that the courts will
not enforce the agreement;
(5) Defective Agency. The [party resisting arbitration] did not sign the
arbitration agreement and the signer was not an agent . . . authorized to
commit the subject matter of the instant dispute to arbitration or, if
authorized, breached its fiduciary duty to the opponent in signing an
arbitration agreement of such breadth.
Stempel, Better Approach, supra note 2, at 1434-35 (footnotes omitted). The five
suggested criteria for refusing to enforce ostensible arbitration agreements are
developed at greater length in the article, which also reviews the history of
arbitrability adjudication and historical grounds for refusing to enforce arbitration
clauses.
These five grounds for avoiding an arbitration clause, with minor variants or
additions, would provide courts with a sensible yardstick for determining whether
a written arbitration provision sufficiently satisfied the consent criteria to merit
enforcement. Courts applying this sort of template would not be rejecting arbitra-
tion on the basis of judicial hostility to the concept nor interfering with freedom of
contract. My proposed typology of consent based defenses to arbitrability has been
criticized as merely restating existing defenses available in contract law and thus
tending to "reinvent the wheel." See Ware, Employment Arbitration, supra note 8,
at n.138. What I propose is a refinement of the wheel rather than its reinvention.
In my view, courts have been clumsy in their treatment of the consent aspects of
arbitrability because they have not adapted traditional consent norms of contract
to arbitration. Having more specified arbitrability defenses will assist the judicial
enterprise.
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Although some arbitration proponents might argue that
adoption of a consent scrutiny approach is an overdose of due
process that makes arbitration enforceability too difficult, the
argument is not persuasive. Courts have adjudicated contract
matters for centuries. As noted above,'0 even in the purported
heyday of classical contract doctrine and the objective theory of
contract, courts policed agreements on the bases of the parties'
understanding of the stakes and of the bargain, as well as
issues of consent and fairness. Reinvigorating these traditional
concepts is unlikely to add significantly to the judicial burden.
An initial upsurge in judicial resources devoted to this richer
review of arbitration contracts is likely to be temporary, with
judicial precedents subsequently requiring parties to establish
adequate contracting norms and procedures and to conform
their behavior to the standards enunciated by the courts.
b. Consent based contract interpretation provides a more
useful criteria for determining arbitrability in a manner
consistent with judicial competence.
i. A Non-Securities Example of the Dangers of Neglecting
Consent Analysis
A meaningful doctrine of consent could operate to relieve
courts of the need to engage in more difficult issues that are
less susceptible to adjudication such as statutory conflict, pub-
To some extent, I am also proposing an expansion of the wheel in that I
clearly envision more court based policing of the quality of consent in contracts
than do Professor Ware and other neoclassical contracts scholars. For example,
even though Professor Ware and I agree in general that consent should be the
focus, his preferred consent doctrine is far more likely to hold parties to mass-
imposed form agreements than is mine, at least outside the securities context.
Within securities, our positions reverse to some degree since he places greater
emphasis than do I upon the semi-public nature of the securities self-regulatory
organizations.
Rather, courts using these five grounds for avoiding an arbitration clause
would be ensuring that freedom was actually sufficiently present in the context of
the asserted arbitration contract. In other words, examination of arbitration claus-
es according to these criteria would vindicate the longstanding national policy
Professor Speidel identifies as "freedom from contract." See Speidel. Whither Con-
sent?, supra note 13; Speidel, Afterword, supra note 33. at 262-64.
"' See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text
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lic policy limits on arbitrability or even the historically judicial
issue of unconscionability.5" When focusing on traditional ad-
judication of contract issues such as offer, acceptance, consider-
ation and consent, courts might well do better than they do
when attempting to make broad pronouncements of the law.
Ironically, a recent example, albeit not one from securities
arbitration, was relatively recently rendered by the Supreme
Court in the commercial ADR area. In Vimar Seguros y
Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 2 a fruit distributor
shipped its products overseas. The bill of lading issued for the
transaction, a shipment from Morocco to Massachusetts, con-
tained a clause stating that the transaction would be governed
by Japanese law and that any disputes arising under the ar-
rangement would be arbitrated in Japan before the Tokyo
Maritime Arbitration Commission of the Japan Shipping Ex-
change, Inc. The vessel was time-chartered to a Japanese com-
pany. A dispute arose, but the claimant unsuccessfully resisted
arbitration on consent grounds, arguing that the bill of lading
was a contract of adhesion. The claimant also lost on the issue
on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari: Was the arbi-
tration provision barred by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
("COGSA"), a federal statute providing that any limitation on
liability contained in a shipping agreement was unenforce-
able?" In particular, did the required arbitration in a distant
forum with potentially less favorable contract breach remedies
constitute what was in effect a limitation on liability?
The Court held that COGSA did not conflict with the FAA
and that an arbitration clause in an arguably inconvenient
forum would not constitute a limitation of remedies of the
shipper within the meaning of COGSA. Because the Court
found arbitration (even in Japan) not to be the functional
equivalent of a limitation on liability, the Court found no con-
flict between COGSA and the Federal Arbitration Act. Had a
51 Although I have advocated a continued strong role for unconscionability
analysis as a means of policing arbitration agreements, a court's determination
that an agreement is excessively favorable to one party (a definition of unconscio-
nability) involves the court in more of the semi-legislative determination of regu-
lating private behavior than does adjudication of matters such as the scope of the
agreement, the existence of fraud or the presence of consent.
52 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995).
" See 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1936).
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conflict existed, the Court would have been forced to determine
which statute controlled. Remarkably, only Justice Stevens
dissented, and only he raised any concern over consent and
contracting fairness.' Although Justice Stevens appreciated
the general judicial desire to avoid statuary conflicts, he
thought the majority had "ignored a much less damaging way
to harmonize COGSA with the FAA" through a serious consid-
eration of the contractual consent and validity issues presented
by the oppressive application of the billing of lading."
Justice Stevens is right on two counts. First, as he notes,
serious contract policing of arbitration agreements would, as in
Vimar, frequently lead to invalidation or modification of arbi-
tration clauses, thus avoiding some statutory conflicts. In addi-
" Justice Stevens also criticized the Courts continued adherence to and expan-
sion of Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), which enforced a
ticket stub forum selection clause. Although the contract consent issue was not
directly addressed by the majority, Justice Stevens noted the importance of the
matter through citation to a similar case involving a different bill of lading provi-
sion:
The shipowners stress the consensual nature of the clause, arguing that
a bill of lading is but a contract. But that is so at most in name only;,
the clause, as we are told, is now in practically all bills of lading issued
by steamship companies doing business to and from the United States.
Obviously the individual shipper has no opportunity to repudiate the
document agreed upon by the trade, even if he has actually examined it
and all its twenty-eight lengthy paragraphs, of which this is [but one
clause in the middle]. This lack of equality of bargaining power has long
been recognized in our law; and stipulations for unreasonable exemption
of the carrier have not been allowed to stand. Hence so definite a relin-
quishment of what the law gives the cargo as is found here can hardly
be found reasonable without direct authorization of law.
Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2335 (quoting United States v. Farr Sugar Corp., 191 F.2d
370, 374 (1951)). Perhaps nostalgically, I note that Justice Stevens quotes from a
Second Circuit case decided a half-century before, underscoring the degree to
which the modem Court has, but for perhaps Justice Stevens alone, strayed from
the commitment to consent and common sense contract construction once exhibited
by the American bench. See Braucher, supra note 38, at 60 (modem Court decides
contract matters as though hypnotized by "blinding fog' of freedom to contract
rhetoric), 72 (in contract cases reviewed by Professor Braucher, Justice Stevens
"plays the role of most sensible member of the Supreme Court").
Justice O'Connor concurred "because the District Court has retained jurisdic-
tion over this case while the arbitration proceeds, [so that] any claim of lessening
of liability that might arise out of the arbitrators' interpretation of the bill of
ladings choice of law clause, or out of their application of COGSA, is premature."
Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2330. As of this writing, there has been no further reported
decision in Vimar.
5' Vimar, 115 S. Ct. at 2337 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tion, there is a second benefit from focusing on contract first
and statute or policy second: Courts are generally better
equipped to assess contract or other private law disputes than
to determine and evaluate statutory meaning and public policy.
Although these latter types of evaluation are unavoidable for
modern courts, this hardly requires courts to pursue the poten-
tially sweeping activism of setting forth a general statutory
pronouncement or making an interstitial or extrapolated as-
sessment of the American polity's real views about arbitration.
Instead, a court might better function as a plain vanilla judi-
ciary and decide contract disputes largely according to the
norms of contract, including the consent criterion. 6 Contract
policing according to consent and other criteria is an essential-
ly more focused adjudicatory role and less a policymaking role.
As such, it should generally be preferred for courts under the
norms of the American politico-legal system.
ii. Applying Consent Criteria for Better Determinations of
Securities Arbitrability
Under the current regime of softpedaling consent issues
and forcing many cases into the problem of conflicting rules
and public policy, the legal profession will probably continue to
diverge markedly over arbitration issues. If a brokerage house
arbitration agreement provides that a Buffalo retiree must
arbitrate a churning claim against her New York stockbroker
in Vladivostok, reasonable observers would find the arrange-
ment unconscionable or a substantive violation of the 1934 Act
or both. But does it violate substantive law for the hypothetical
little old lady in tennis shoes to shuffle from Buffalo to Man-
hattan to arbitrate these claims? Academics and judges may
disagree over these matters of legislative reach and public poli-
cy. But these same jurists may be considerably more united in
addressing the degree of knowing and voluntary consent exhib-
ited in a contracts transaction. Rather than focusing on the
convenience and tactical advantages of such disputes, the legal
" I emphasize again, however, that my view of the correct contract based ap-
plication of consent criteria is somewhat more searching than other scholars have
found it to be in areas outside of arbitration. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 29, at
512-63.
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system should focus on whether the consumer was adequately
informed and agreed to arbitrate in Manhattan. If so, such
agreements should ordinarily be enforced. As discussed below,
consent based arbitral adjudication would be neither costly nor
eviscerating of arbitration.
Courts may be able to reach greater agreement and consis-
tency when adjudicating issues of consent, provided we can
agree on the general ground rules regarding what constitutes
consent. Of course, continued division is undoubtedly possible,
with some Justices willing to find consent in the most cursory
signature on boilerplate forms while others may require pains-
taking explanation and roughly equal bargaining power as
prerequisites to a finding of consent. But under a doctrinal
regime that makes a reasonably searching inquiry into con-
sent, my prediction is that most courts would agree more often
than lawyers agree over issues of statutory conflict, public
policy, politics and whether a particular disadvantage created
by contract constitutes a substantive diminution of substantive
rights.
Consequently, a serious consent doctrine seriously enforced
holds the potential for making arbitration law a good deal
more consistent and candid. If the primary issue in most
arbitrability disputes is consent rather than public policy or
statutory conflict, the court's (or arbitrator's) inquiry is the rel-
atively simple one of determining whether the complaining
party in fact consented to the arbitration provision of which it
complains. This is what courts historically have done well and
what historically has been assigned to courts in U.S. polity.
When courts must deal with questions of statutory conflict and
public policy, they enter a realm closer to, and perhaps
overlapping into, the domain of the legislature. Even though
assessment of substantive law and fundamental fairness are
traditional judicial activities, they are areas of adjudication
that more frequently turn on the ideological divisions of the
bench.
Applied to securities, a consent regime would worry less
about whether a particular arbitration provision was inconsis-
tent with national securities regulation and worry more about
whether there was actual consent. If the court finds real con-
sent, it should hesitate to disturb the arbitration arrangement
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unless it finds the arbitration scheme one that creates a sub-
stantial danger for national securities regulation policy.
A tougher issue arises when the industry's commitment to
arbitration is so uniform and widespread that the only means
by which even the best informed consumer can escape securi-
ties arbitration is to avoid the securities based financial mar-
kets altogether. At the Symposium panel discussion, G. Rich-
ard Shell recounted his humorous but troubling episode at-
tempting to avoid the standard arbitration clause in several
brokerage agreements he was pursuing on behalf of family
members." Because he is a sophisticated lawyer/businessper-
son/scholar and because he effectively controlled several ac-
counts, the general counsel for the brokerage house was willing
to waive the arbitration clause after Professor Shell's relatively
mighty efforts to avoid mandatory arbitration. Where average
customers are involved, this outcome is unlikely, prompting
the question as to whether arbitration clauses insisted upon as
a condition of opening an account should be enforced. Sympo-
sium participants suggested that a few smaller brokers offered
account agreements without arbitration clauses, but these are
seemingly too difficult to find for most consumers, including
Professor Shell, who found it more effective to argue with a
major broker than to shop for a more pliable minor broker. 8
Six years ago, I argued for enforcement even where the
industry offered no nonarbitration version of the discretionary
account clause," and I continue to hold to this view concern-
ing this type of brokerage agreement. First, by definition, the
discretionary trading account is something for the above-aver-
age consumer. Before one buys stocks, let alone needs instan-
taneous broker discretion, one needs a fair amount of wealth
as compared to the average American. Holders of such ac-
counts should not include the proverbial little old lady in ten-
nis shoes. Perhaps the securities industry should not be open-
ing such accounts for average or unsophisticated customers
(i.e., even little old ladies with money), but that is an issue dif-
, See G. Richard Shell, Fair Play, Consent & Securities Arbitration: A Com-
ment on Speidel, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1365, 1369-70 (1996).
" See Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Arbitration: Better for Investors than the
Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1503, 1504-05 (1996) (brokerage houses increasingly
tending to require arbitration as a condition of doing any business with investor).
" See Stempel, Pitfalls, supra note 13, at 288-92.
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ferent from arbitrability. My point is that one does not need a
discretionary trading account to participate in the American
capitalist system." If a typical investor is adequately apprised
about the arbitration clause, the investor may not enjoy Profes-
sor Shell's success in haggling over the term, but the term is
not oppressive so long as the investor can reject the agreement
and instead invest in nondiscretionary trade brokerage ac-
counts, mutual funds or direct purchase of stock from the issue
company.
The hard questions about adhesion and escape occur if
these alternative investment vehicles are uniformly offered on
an "arbitration only" basis. Although the investor may in theo-
ry spurn an imposed arbitration agreement affecting securities
in favor of her local bank or cash in the mattress, these are
probably not realistic financial options when certificates of de-
posit are paying six percent and the stock market has risen at
an average annual rate of nearly fifteen percent during the
past decade. Worse yet, current Supreme Court jurisprudence
admits of no readily ascertainable stopping point for containing
the march to mandatory arbitration. After cases like Badie v.
Bank of America, allowing arbitration to be "contracted for" by
virtue of continuing use of a credit card," it seems only a
matter of time before commercial banks insert arbitration
clauses in the checking and savings account agreements of
their customers.62 If these are sustained by the judiciary, the
Although it obviously helps to have money, access to expertise and negotiat-
ing leverage. See, eg., Diana B. Henriques & Floyd Norris, Wealthy, Helped by
Wall St., Find New Ways to Escape Tax on Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, at
Al (describing proliferation of new transactions designed to avoid or minimize
capital gains taxes offered by investment bankers to wealthy, illustrating topic
with description of entrepreneur's avoidance of $54 million in capital gains tax).
For example, since 1988 the IRS reports that taxpayers with only mutual funds as
an investment have reported a 200% increase in capital gains while other inves-
tors have reported reduced capital gains. Id.
61 Badie v. Bank of America, No. 94-4916, 1994 WL 660730 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994) (appellate court sustains trial court ruling that bank
credit card customers bound by compulsory arbitration agreements established by
notice mailed to customers with regular monthly statements); see Engalla v.
Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 638-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(rejecting fraud defense to arbitration even though clause in medical group's con-
tract promised hearing within 60 days although group aware that 99% of prior
claims took nearly two years to receive hearing), review granted and opinion
superseded, 905 P.2d 416 (Cal. 1995) (lower court holding subject to change after
state supreme court review).
'2 See Joseph T. McLaughlin, Arbitrability: Current Trends in the United States,
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investor literally has no escape from arbitral adhesion other
than the mattress. Without doubt, the judiciary must retain
enough vestige of the consent criterion to draw a prohibitive
line prior to this state of affairs. My own preference is that the
line be drawn in the financial industry. Unless prospective
investors have at least a significant opportunity to participate
in securities investment without arbitration, there is insuffi-
cient meaningful choice to make arbitration clauses enforce-
able. Mutual funds would suffice, as would brokerage accounts
without mandatory arbitration offered by at least two major
brokers, so long as this information was not too costly to un-
earth and so long as the consumer is not pressured away from
pursuing the nonarbitration version of the account. Differential
pricing would not invalidate such agreements so long as the
presumably higher price for retaining the litigation option was
not prohibitively expensive.
4. Consent as "Market" Barometer of Fairness
In addition to providing for a sounder approach to deter-
mining arbitrability, application of consent criteria can serve
the value the Supreme Court claims to have fostered with its
sweeping enforcement of arbitration: deference to the private
market of transactions. The prevailing economic and legal the-
ory posits that the economic system and private behavior gen-
erally will better succeed where the parties are accorded wide
latitude in structuring their relations. But the prevailing theo-
ry becomes ludicrous when there is no real give and take63
between contracting parties. When the securities industry, for
59 ALB. L. REv. 905, 926-28 (1996) (suggesting that expansion of reach of Federal
Arbitration Act and increasing willingness of both federal and state courts to up-
hold mass imposition of arbitration clauses opens up realistic possibility of
arbitration becoming part of even routine consumer contracts). The success of Bank
of America's efforts to "contract" to arbitrate by junk mail and of computer and
software makers to "contract" to arbitrate through use of wrapping and packaging
suggests that merchants now have a wide array of options for forcing arbitration
on customers and that these forms of "contract" will be upheld by many, perhaps
most, courts. See supra note 8 (citing computer packaging arbitration cases).
' I again emphasize that real give and take does not require elaborate bar-
gaining over all aspects of a transaction. Consent may be adequate where the par-
ties have adequate alternatives or are sufficiently aware of the implications of
their decision such that they may be held to a conscious decision to "take" a con-
tract term rather than "leave" it.
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example, moves massively toward mandatory arbitration, a
free market ceases to exist, at least as to dispute resolution,
unless the customer or the employee has some meaningful
alternatives. The presence of alternatives is part of the essence
of a free market. Without such alternatives, producers and
consumers have no more freedom or incentive to reach optimal
results than would exist if business policy were declared by the
Politburo. In effect, the jurisprudence of the 1980s and 1990s
has permitted a private interest group version of the Politburo
to impose a national policy of mandatory arbitration that
essentially eliminates a market for securities disputes for all
but the most affluent investors-and apparently no employ-
ees-and a few dogged academics like Professor Shell.'
If the courts were to conduct a significant inquiry into the
indicia of consent and to require a minimally adequate version
of consent as a prerequisite to enforcing arbitration agree-
ments, the securities industry and American business in gener-
al would have a substantial incentive to offer a variety of dis-
pute resolution products among which consumers could choose,
with prices differentiated according to particular disputing
options. In this type of environment, consumer behavior would
provide powerful evidence of the relative preferences for and
value of the disputing alternatives. Perhaps arbitration would
be the dispute resolution means of choice. Perhaps not. But
until the Court actually protects the conditions of free market
exchange by protecting a basic assumption of the market (con-
sensual agreement), there is no real ADR market in contract,
only industry fiat achieved through either monopoly power or
concerted activity. Although the mandated arbitration of the
securities industry is probably not violative of the antitrust
laws-although the issue probably deserves more scrutiny than
it will ever receive-neither is it the sort of free-flowing mar-
ket that justifies judicial deference to the mass-produced arbi-
"Forgotten in the judiciary's ideological infatuation with markets and arbitra-
tion is the ability of private actors to garner effectively inescapable power rivaling
that of the government. See Robin Toner, Harry and Louise Were Right, Sort Of,
N.Y. TMEs, Nov. 24, 1996, § 4, at 1 (although insurers campaigned against
Clinton Administration health care proposals as stripping consumers of choice, em-
ployer-supported health insurance plans, the major source of health insurance,
increasingly offer no choice among insurers and less choice over terms of selecting
or seeing physicians).
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tration clauses found in brokerage agreements and employ-
ment papers signed by workers in the securities industry.
In addition, there is another market eliminated by the
Supreme Court's recent infatuation with arbitration: the mar-
ket among states to regulate arbitration agreements in differ-
ent ways so long as not inconsistent with the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act. This shortcoming is discussed below.5
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S SCHIZOPHRENIA AND RESULT-
DRIVEN INTERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT
A. The Supreme Court's Inconsistent and Partisan Application
of Functional and Formal Arbitration Jurisprudence
Although the Court's reconsideration of arbitrability began
during the 1970s,66 the 1980s and 1990s saw something of a
revolution in the Court's approach to arbitration. In 1983, the
Court issued a strong opinion favoring the use of court injunc-
tive power to enforce predispute arbitration agreements.67 In
1984, it went one better by not only requiring arbitrability of a
franchise dispute in the face of arguably contrary state law,
but also declaring that the Federal Arbitration Act, passed in
1926,68 established substantive federal law applicable in both
state and federal proceedings.69  This 1984 decision in
Southland v. Keating marked a major change in the Court's
reading of the Act, much to the consternation of Justice
O'Connor, who viewed the Act as merely setting forth the pro-
cedural rules regarding enforcement of arbitration clauses in
federal court.7"
6 See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
66 See, e.g., Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (enforcing arbi-
tration clause in towing contract entered into by damaged vessel and salvage oper-
ation). Despite signs of more support for arbitration, other Court decisions in the
1970s and 1980s rebuffed arbitration of certain statutory claims, making the area
one ripe for substantial change in the mid-1980s. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of
West Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claims);
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (Fair Labor
Standards Act); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (Title VII).
' Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
6' 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1994).
"' Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
71 See id. at 24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.). In particu-
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During the next dozen years, as chronicled in detail
throughout this Symposium,7 the Court's enthusiasm for ar-
bitration continued to grow. In 1987, the Court signaled anoth-
er major reversal of the field by holding that claims brought
under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act were subject to arbi-
tration.72 In 1989, it went the next yard and held that claims
under the 1933 Securities Act were arbitrable,7 expressly re-
versing the 1953 Wilko v. Swan decision and giving some post-
humous revenge to Justice Frankfurter, who had strongly
dissented.74
In 1991, the Court required a broker alleging age discrimi-
nation claims to arbitrate8 even though earlier Court prece-
dent had suggested that civil rights and job discrimination
claims were inapt for arbitration,7" and even though the bro-
ker was required by New York Stock Exchange Rules to sign
the arbitration agreement as a condition of his employment.'
After a decade of substantial change in arbitration law,
one might have expected a rest from the Court. However, dur-
ing the Court's 1994 Term, it decided four arbitration cases.'
lax, Justice O'Connor relied on the Court precedent of Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1956), which held that in diversity jurisdiction
cases, state law on arbitration was controlling.
"' See Selya, supra note 42; Steinberg, supra note 58, at 1503-07 (discussing
evolution of arbitration jurisprudence and processing of securities disputes by
courts and arbitrators).
72 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, reh'g de.
nied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
" See Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Expres, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989).
' See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
See supra note 1.
In addition to the obviously coercive undertones of the arrangement, the
Arbitration Act provides that it does not apply to a "contract of employment." 9
U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The Court avoided this limitation through the sort of reasoning
that would give most first-year law students a chuckle: The arbitration provision
was not part of a "contract of employment" since it was a separate document
between the employee and the NYSE. The Court conveniently ignored the
employee's compulsion to sign with the NYSE because his employer compelled him
to do so as part of the employment relationship. Justice Stevens provided a typi-
cally terse and insightful dissent which fell on deaf ears.
76 Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 US. 265 (1995);
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995); First Op-
tions of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995); Vimar Seguro3 y
Reaseguros v. M/ Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995).
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Arguably, all were unnecessary in that these decisions did not
clarify the law much or reach out to decide pressing national
issues. As one commentator summarized:
Taken as a whole, the four cases [decided in 1995] ... do not gener-
ate unusual outcomes. The determinations are characteristically
supportive of arbitration; the decisional content of the opinions re-
hearses and reinforces existing doctrine. A few statements provide
new insight into the court's thinking on arbitration, but even these
additions only amount to new twists and turns in the Court's fantas-
tic doctrinal constructs on arbitration. The wall of judicial policy
that protects arbitration is solid and looms large, and appears in-
creasingly impossible to scale."'
But the 1995 term cases arguably did more than just solid-
ify and inch outward the breadth of pro-arbitration doctrine. In
one of the cases, the Court lost sight of its normal solicitude of
federalism as well as consent values when it struck down
Montana's attempt to require that arbitration clauses be more
clearly presented to contracting parties to lessen the danger of
a party being bound to arbitrate due to clauses quietly slipped
into the fine print of lengthy boilerplate contracts." Only Jus-
tice Thomas dissented, on grounds of states' rights rather than
consumer fairness or contractual consent.81 Justice O'Connor,
apparently weary of the fight to hold the Arbitration Act to its
pre-1984 meaning, did not even join the dissent.
Much of the past decade's judicial receptiveness toward
arbitration is worth applause. For the most part, arbitration is
a fair and effective means of dispute resolution.82 On the
whole, society should be happy to see the demise of older pre-
cedents regarding ADR as evil and courts as sublime. Prior to
the court's quiet revolution on arbitration, contracting parties
frequently used judge made "exceptions" to arbitrability simply
as tactical ploys for forum shopping or other efforts to gain a
step on litigation opponents.'
"9 See Thomas E. Carboneau, Beyond Trilogies: A New Bill of Rights and Law
Practice Through the Contract of Arbitration, 6 AM. J. INT'L ARB. 1, 2 (1995) there-
inafter Beyond Trilogies].
" Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
'1 Id. at 1662 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
82 By way of disclosure, I should add that I have been involved in two com-
mercial arbitrations as counsel and that both were resolved favorably to my for-
mer clients. In addition, I have served as both a commercial and securities arbi-
trator.
See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. McGuire & Co., 391 F.2d 821
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But in its drive to usher in the new era and reduce the
court's monopoly on dispute resolution, the Court's decisions
have exhibited a disturbing intellectual expediency, an insensi-
tivity to serious problems of consent and fairness. Oddly, the
Court has been most interested in departing from its embrace
of arbitration largely on behalf of litigants who appear less
deserving of a respite from the arbitration juggernaut.
For example, the Court's 1996 decision in Casarotto strik-
ing down Montana's full disclosure provision sided with the
owners of the Subway sandwich shop chain in a dispute with
dissident franchisees.' In light of Subway's reputation as a
franchise of limited value to its franchisees and the substantial
fairness issues that have been raised about franchising gener-
ally, arbitration clauses in franchise agreements would seem a
particularly good candidate for full disclosure laws such as
Montana's.'s Certainly, the preemptive scope of the Federal
Arbitration Act can be read as prohibiting state efforts of this
type. But a less formalistic and wooden view of the Act would
prohibit state efforts to stand in the way of enforcing arbitra-
tion agreements yet nonetheless permit states to provide
nonburdensome ground rules for ensuring that arbitration
agreements were truly knowing and voluntary, an assumption
that was a driving force behind the Federal Arbitration Act
along with dispute resolution efficiency.'
The Supreme Court, of course, is not alone in its resis-
tance to state law that in any way treats arbitration differently
(2d Cir. 1968) (antitrust claims incompatible with arbitration due to statutory na-
ture and public interest).
Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996). The Subway sub shop kingdom is reputed-
ly something less than a franchisee's nirvana. For example, one source for a 1994
Wall Street Journal article equated ownership of a Subway franchise as "basically
buying yourself a low-paying job." Barbara March, Sandwich Shop Chain Surges,
But to Run One Can Take Heroic Effort, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1992, at Al.
See supra note 84.
s' I have reviewed the entire legislative history of the Act, which is hardly a
major accomplishment in light of its slimness. A fair reading of the congressional
materials shows that the states' rights concerns of Justices O'Connor and Thomas
cannot be foreclosed, and that the drafters were a good deal more concerned about
worker rights to avoid coercion into predispute arbitration clauses than was the
Gilmer Court. A more comprehensive examination of the origin of the Act, includ-
ing prior interest group activity and earlier attempted legislation, comes to a more
firmly rooted view that the Act was intended to apply only in federal courts. See
MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 47, chs. 7-9.
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than other contracts. Prior to Casarotto, the leading case on
the issue, Securities Industry Association v. Connolly,7
reached the same conclusion. Connolly's author, Judge Bruce
Selya, is of course a featured speaker in this Symposium. At
the risk of displaying bad manners by criticizing a participant
from another panel,' it seems inescapable to me that
Connolly displays the same excessive formalism and narrow
focus regarding the Arbitration Act as does Casarotto, although
with the Selya trademark of far more interesting prose.
Connolly and Casarotto both adopt the premise that any dis-
tinction affecting an arbitration contract is automatically invid-
ious and therefore inconsistent with the Act, a most strident
pose in light of the creative manner in which the Act was
metamorphosized into substantive law in the 1984 Southland
decision. Even without the enacting Congress' likely surprise
at the extension of the Act, it hardly follows that a state law
seeking to enhance volitional arbitration is fatally inconsistent
with the Act. Both Connolly and Casarotto assume that greater
disclosure unduly hinders arbitration, inadvertently suggesting
that franchisees like the Casarottos or the stock investors
Massachusetts sought to protect in Connolly would never have
signed an arbitration form had they appreciated what they
were doing. This is hardly a strong recommendation for the
supposed ADR Elysian Fields of arbitration.
But Connolly is more defensible than Casarotto. The Mas-
sachusetts law at issue in Connolly not only required a "con-
spicuous" presentation of the arbitration clause and a written
disclosure of the "legal effect of the pre-dispute arbitration
883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989).
'8 However, my chutzpa is considerably less than that of Judge Trieweiler, who
not only authored the Montana Supreme Court's Casarotto opinions but also con-
curred especially to attack Judge Selya's Connolly opinion with vigor bordering on
the personal. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995) (reaffirming
earlier holding after remand for consideration in light of Terminex case); Casarotto
v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994); Id. at 939 (Trieweiler, J., specially con-
curring) (finding Connolly opinion "offend[ing]", "naive," "self-serving" and "cynical").
Perhaps excessive in its rhetoric-although one is hard-pressed to bring oneself
to pity Judge Selya in a verbal exchange-the Trieweiler concurrence raises serious
concerns that went unheeded in the Supreme Court: "[Federal court] decisions
have perverted the purpose of the FAA from one to accomplish judicial neutrality,
to one of open hostility to any legislative effort to assure that unsophisticated
parties to contracts of adhesion at least understand the rights they are giving up."
Id. at 941 (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring).
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contract," but also made it illegal for brokerage houses to re-
quire arbitration as a "nonnegotiable condition precedent to
account relationships." 9 This last trait seriously hinders arbi-
tration and is perhaps, but not indubitably, adverse to the
Federal Act's notion of nondiscrimination against the arbitra-
tion agreement." By contrast, the Montana law struck down
in Casarotto required only prominent disclosure and explana-
tion. Subway and other franchisers, indeed businesses of all
types, continued to be free under the Montana law to insist on
arbitration as a condition of doing business. Under those cir-
cumstances, a state's legislative insistence on meaningful dis-
closure is simply not the sort of judicial hostility that prompted
Congress to pass the Arbitration Act. In addition, respect for
state prerogatives augers in favor of placing reasonable limits
on the preemptive reach of the Federal Act. Viewed functional-
ly rather than formally, Montana's law deserved more defer-
ence even if Massachusetts' law did not.
B. Jurisprudential Inconsistency and the Felt Necessities of the
Time
One of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's many pithy quota-
tions posited (in best legal realist fashion thirty years prior to
the Legal Realist movement) that judges decide cases not only
on the basis of precedent but also based on the "felt necessities
of the time."9' During the past two decades, the United States
Supreme Court has devoted a good deal of its energies to the
jurisprudence of alternative dispute resolution, most promi-
nently arbitration. Its decisions in this arena comfortably fit
Holmes's maxim: There exists a widespread view that society
is choking on baroque litigation and needs streamlined dispute
' See Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1117 (citing MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 950, §
12.204(G)(1)(a)-(c) (1988)).
1 For example, had the Massachusetts law been upheld, brokers could have
satisfied the negotiability standard by offering commissions of X where the custom-
er agreed to arbitrate and 5X where the customer would not execute the arbitra-
tion agreement. This sort of dramatic cost differential would undoubtedly prompt
most customers to elect arbitration and allow the broker to make handsome profits
even if faced with troublesome litigants in the nonarbitration accounts, yet would
satisfy the state law standard of ensuring that consumers had some choice regard-
ing arbitration.
91 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881).
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resolution. Not surprisingly, a Supreme Court holding this
view can be expected to render decisions promoting arbitration
and other forms of ADR. Judicial decisions are not suspect
merely because they reflect contemporary attitudes, but the po-
tential always exists for such decisions to sacrifice logic or
principle upon the altar of expediency or ideology. The Court's
approaches to construing the Federal Arbitration Act, the
linchpin of these decisions, has been marred by vacillation
between a wooden formalism and a freewheeling sort of
purposive dynamic interpretation-some would say a rewrit-
ing-of the Act. The Court should resolve this jurisprudential
split personality in favor of a consistently purpose-oriented
approach to construing the Arbitration Act that promotes arbi-
tration without losing sight of other legal and social values.
For example, Southland v. Keating is a pivotal opinion
that federalized American arbitration law. As such, it is a con-
troversial opinion which dramatically expanded the reach of
the Act and sub silentio overturned a twenty five-year-old
precedent, Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,92 which
had construed the Act to be procedural in nature and not to
override substantive state law otherwise applicable under the
Erie doctrine.93 The Southland majority fails even to mention
Bernhardt, acting as though it either wrote upon the proverbi-
al clean slate or as if the substantive federal law created by
the Act were obvious. 4 Only Justice O'Connor, writing for a
two-person dissent, cites Bernhardt, chiding the majority for
failing to come to grips with important adverse precedent."
As to precedent and stare decisis, there is no doubt that Jus-
tice O'Connor's criticism of the Southland majority is well-
350 U.S. 198 (1956).
" Id. at 202 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (abolishing no-
tion of general federal common law applicable to interstate disputes and requiring
that where jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship federal court
must apply state substantive law in resolving dispute)); see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (as corollary to Erie doctrine, federal court
presiding over diversity jurisdiction case must utilize choice of law rules of forum
state).
" See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 1-17 (1984) (no mention of
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America in Southland majority opinion).
" See id. at 23-24 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing
Bernhardt as controlling and accusing majority of erroneously ignoring or improp-
erly overruling Bernhardt without sufficient explanation).
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taken. Bernhardt should have been controlling absent direct
refutation by the majority. On the question of legislative mean-
ing and intent, leading scholars, including Professor Speidel,
have also sided with O'Connor's perspective, finding the better
view that the original intent of Congress was that the Act
apply in federal court but not in state court.' Professor
Macneil is particularly critical of the Southland view of the Act
and demonstrates beyond serious question that the Bernhardt
reading of the Act is more consistent with original intent. '
He concludes that the Court's purported legislative history and
intent of the Act is "pathological" and illegitimate: "ITihere are
some rules of the game [of fair advocacy with statutory history
and intent]-violated grievously, I believe, by Chief Justice
Burger in Southland Corp. v. Keating .... .'
Ironically, the Court has not only turned its back on the
more persuasive original reading of the Act, but also negated
the enacting Congress' concern that the Act not lead to enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements through contracts of adhesion.
As chronicled in Professor Macneil's history of the Act, colloquy
over an earlier, unenacted version of the Act reflects con-
gressional concern that a law overcoming historical judicial
reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements not result in ero-
sion of consent concerns:
Senator [ ] Walsh then expressed concern about what we might now
call the adhesive aspects of arbitration contracts. Having said that
he saw no reason "why, when two men voluntarily agree to submit
their controversy to arbitration, they should not be compelled to
have it decided that way," he went on:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of
these contracts that are entered into are really not vol-
See IAN R. MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 10.5.3 (1994); MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBrrRATION LAW, supra note 47; Sternlight, supra note 46, at 664-66;
Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Require-
ment: What's Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 385, 389 (1992)
(all essentially agreeing with interpretation of Arbitration Act proffered by
Bernhardt majority and Justice O'Connor's dissent in Southland).
' See ACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 47, ch. 9; See espe-
cially MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 96, at 117 (quoting House
Judiciary Committee Report, H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1926))
(stating that Act is procedural and is designed to ensure enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements by the courts of the United States), 118 (noting Report's focus on
federal courts only).
93 MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 96, at 170.
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untarily [sic] things at all. Take an insurance policy;
there is a blank in it. You can take that or you can leave
it. The agent has no power at all to decide it. Either you
can make that contract or you can not make any contract.
It is the same with a good many contracts of employment
[the type of agreement in Gilmer]. A man says, "These are
our terms. All right, take it or leave it." Well, there is
nothing for the man to do except to sign it; and then he
surrenders his right to have his case tried by the court,
and has to have it tried before a tribunal in which he has
no confidence at all.
[W.H.H.] Piatt [a witness for the bill from the New York Commerce
Association] responded that it was not the intention of the bill to
cover insurance cases. Senator Walsh continued to express concern
about this problem, giving other examples- freight contracts [the
problem in Vimar] and construction contracts-and pressing Piatt
on the point. Piatt apparently conceded the need to do something
about the problem.9
In other words, there is significant evidence to suggest that the
enacting Congress would not have approved of the Act's appli-
cation to instances of coercive consent. But like the enacting
Congress' intent to limit the Act to federal courts and to re-
spect state prerogatives, this dollop of originalism favoring
those resisting arbitration has been swept away via the legal
fictions of the current Supreme Court.
For many principled legal scholars, of course, a demonstra-
tion of departure from original intent would be in itself an
irrebuttably damning indictment. Unfortunately, while many
of them are on the Court, either initially or ultimately they
have receded from any defense of originalism in the interpreta-
tion of the Act."°0 While there are worse things than philo-
sophical inconsistency, the arbitration cases are something of
" MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 96, at 90 (footnotes omit-
ted) (quoting Senator Walsh at length from Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess.,
at 2 (1923)) (footnote omitted).
10 Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist initially fought the Southland interpreta-
tion but have apparently given up, leaving only Justice Thomas (as of his 1996
dissent in Casarotto) to continue to fight for originalism. Justice Scalia is more
textualist than originalist, but one can hardly regard § 2 of the Act as compelling
the Southland result. One might have then expected Justice Scalia to follow origi-
nal intent, or at least to have some interest in correctly discerning it, but he has
uniformly supported the expansive application of the Act to all disputes. Justice
Kennedy is ordinarily viewed as something of an originalist but has also routinely
supported expanded arbitration in the Southland model.
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an embarrassment for the Court's conservatives: Faced with a
choice between the desires of the business establishment and
the original intent of Congress, they have ultimately sided
with industry.
But as Ralph Waldo Emerson observed, a foolish consis-
tency is the hobgoblin of small minds. There are substantial
reasons why a jurist of any ideology would seek to "think big"
and in evolutive fashion about the Arbitration Act. As noted
above, a widely held view among lawyers and laypersons posits
that society has too much litigation and that laws should be
interpreted to further rather than retard ADR initiatives. To
be sure, serious scholarship has dramatically undermined the
argument that the Act was originally intended to create sub-
stantive federal law. In addition, the Arbitration Act predates
the 1938 Erie v. Tompkins revolution in federal and state judi-
cial relations and the revolutionary broadening in the Court's
notions of what constituted interstate commerce that occurred
during the 1930s and 1940s. In 1926, the connotation of com-
merce was sufficiently narrower, making it quite possible, per-
haps even likely, that the enacting Congress envisioned that
the Act would really only apply in cases otherwise eligible for
federal court jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, the Act's text, legislative history and back-
ground are hardly crystal clear. The Act is sufficiently indeter-
minate that its recasting as substantive federal law is at least
permissible. Although Erie is seen as a decision supporting
state autonomy, it is also seen as a decision promoting consis-
tency and attempting to curb undue forum shopping."' These
goals of Erie are better met through a federal law that sup-
plants contrary state law. 12 With twenty-twenty hindsight,
the enacting Congress might well have spelled out a substan-
tive and preemptive reach for the Federal Arbitration Act.
In addition, irrespective of either actual or reconstructed
congressional intent, Southland can be well defended on the
ground that it modernized the Act in a manner consistent with
longstanding legal, social and political preferences. Construing
... See Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (Vtwin aims" of Erie are
"discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of
the laws").
" Defined as state law on arbitration that significantly impairs the federal
Act's policy of enforcing proper arbitration agreements.
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the 1926 Arbitration Act to create substantive federal law "up-
dates" and modernizes the statute to make it more useful in an
era of growing caseloads and interest in ADR.'03 When con-
fronted with an interpretative fork in the road, there is noth-
ing inherently wrong with the Court using these factors to
decide the case so long as other, more commanding factors do
not compel the court to choose a different path.
Among the Justices deciding Southland, only Justice
Stevens candidly addressed the dynamic statutory interpreta-
tion at work in the case, observing that
Justice O'Connor's review of the legislative history of the Federal
Arbitration Act demonstrates that the 1925 Congress that enacted
the statute viewed the statute as essentially procedural in nature,
[however] I am persuaded that the intervening developments in the
law compel the conclusion that the Court has reached.1
Justice Stevens went on to note that treating the Act as sub-
stantive federal law did not require wholesale displacement of
state law because "[tihe limited objective of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act was to abrogate the general common-law rule
against specific enforcement of arbitration agreements... [but
that] beyond this conclusion, which seems compelled by the
language of § 2 [of the Act] and case law concerning the Act, it
is by no means clear that Congress intended entirely to dis-
place state authority in this field." °5 Faced with this legal
landscape, Justice Stevens wisely urged that the Court's stan-
dard operating procedure of refraining from unnecessary inval-
idation of state law limit the sweep of the Southland holding.
This approach would have wisely called for a different result in
Casarotto and would have preserved Montana's law requiring
clear disclosure of predispute arbitration agreements. Yet Jus-
tice Stevens was silent in Casarotto, joining in the majority's
curt reversal of the Montana Supreme Court. 6 Justice
Stevens is not a strict originalist in matters of statutory inter-
pretation 7 and is also something of a pragmatist. Regarding
103 This appears to have been Justice Stevens's view in his Southland concur-
rence. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
104 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
10 Id. at 18.
0' See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
" See William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The
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arbitration, he currently appears to have adopted his now-
familiar stance of adhering even to precedent he views as
wrongly decided in order to protect the reliance interests of so-
cial actors and hence does not argue against the Southland
expansion of the Act."'8
Prior to his apparent fatigue from the fight, Justice
Stevens in Southland argued for both a "dynamic" view of
statutory meaning and a functional or instrumental view of the
courts role in giving meaning to statutes. Dynamic statutory
interpretation is the view that courts should or do in fact con-
strue statutes in light of contemporary circumstances even in
the face of a distinctly contrary original understanding of the
enacting legislature.0 9 Dynamic statutory interpretation
stresses statutory purpose, application and legal evolution as
much or more than the law's text or congressional intent. De-
fenders of the approach, me among them, view it as an ap-
proach that permits courts to assist the lawmaking enterprise,
to make statutes (at the risk of paraphrasing Army recruiters)
the best they can be in light of congressional goals and con-
temporary context. Without doubt, however, the approach also
holds the potential for judicial arrogation of power over the
legislative and executive branches." While this may be a real
Opinions of Justice Stevens, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1149-51.
"os Id. (noting Justice Stevens's pattern in this regard); see William D. Popkin,
An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76
MINN. L. REV. 1133 (1992).
10 See generally WILLIAm N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TION (1994); WILLAi N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PBILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY ch. 7 (2d ed.
1995); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV.
20 (1988) (describing various versions of evolutive statutory construction); Richard
A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L REV. 431
(1989); see also GlIDO CALABRESI, A COMION LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982) (arguing that older statutes should be no more binding than common law
on current courts); Jeffirey W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpre-
tation, Inertial Burdens and a Misleading Version of Democracy, 22 U. TOL L.
REV. 583, 653 (1991); Nicholas Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 412 (1989) ("What Calabresi and Eskridge have shown is
that in many cases, originalism never really served as the actual basis for decid-
ing statutory cases. For years, judges have been profoundly nonoriginalist in decid-
ing cases but have used originalism as a means for justifying their results.7).
10 See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpret-
er, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2209 (1995) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DNAiC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) (arguing that dynamic approach improperly
permits courts to assist current majorities in improperly revising or dismantling
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danger for certain contemporaneously contested social or eco-
nomic issues, the dynamism of Southland can be defended as
legitimate in view of the less than clear text of the law (what-
ever some members of the Court might assert), similarly
murky original congressional intent, the underlying purpose of
the statute to encourage enforcement of valid arbitration claus-
es despite the traditional hesitancy of courts, modern public
policy favoring ADR, and "signals" from Congress that it sup-
ported arbitration even if it was not readily moving to amend
the 1926 Act to make it more sweeping. This sort of judicial
activism-and Southland is judicial activism on behalf of busi-
nesses, demonstrating that judicial activism is not exclusively
a liberal enterprise-simply enlists the Court in improving the
statute in a manner likely to be consistent with current (and
perhaps past) congressional, political and social sentiment.
Consequently, the Court's revisionary expansion of the Act
can be defended on principled grounds. What cannot, in my
view, be defended, however, is the Court's use of dynamic stat-
utory interpretation to expand the reach of the Act coupled
with the Court's unwillingness to give serious attention to
issues of consent and its application of a formal and mecha-
nized style of jurisprudence for enforcing the Act even in the
face of state efforts to ensure greater fairness and higher quali-
ty consent regarding arbitration. Despite Emerson's maxims
about foolish inconsistency, it seems only equitable good sense
that the Court utilize essentially the same method of statutory
construction and adjudicative technique when dealing with
arbitration.' To the extent that the Court has "boot-
legislation of prior majorities without benefit of repeal or amendment)); Martin H.
Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process:
Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV.
803 (1994) (criticizing dynamic approach as providing theoretical smokescreen for
application of personal preferences by courts).
.. Where fields of law differ substantially in type, origin or goal, different in-
terpretative and adjudicatory methodologies may be in order. For example, a stat-
ute such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) can be seen as codifying a flexible principle
of nondiscrimination, what Judge Richard Posner terms a "common law" statute.
See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1987). This type of
statute seems a strong candidate for an evolutive, pragmatic, functional and flexi-
ble approach by the courts. In contrast, penal laws, tax codes or trade laws may
be better viewed as highly specific statutes forming a tighter regulatory framework
more constantly updated by Congress or agencies. These sorts of laws would ap-
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strapped" the Act into becoming a more far-reaching and pow-
erful law, the Court should presumptively utilize a similarly
flexible and functional method of enforcing arbitrability so that
the newly expanded law is not abused or applied in a manner
that exceeds the permissible bounds of "good" dynamic statuto-
ry interpretation. An effective pragmatic approach to policing
the Act would seemingly make substantial use of consent crite-
ria. Consent concerns have long been central to contract
law." The enacting Congress harbored significant consent
concerns;" modern society continues to value consent; con-
sent serves to minimize the dangers of expanded arbitrability;
consent comports well with judicial competence and role; and
consent serves state, federal and market interests implicated
in dispute resolution."4
The Court's arbitration decisions, although largely useful
in reducing judicial monopoly and hostility toward ADR, have
failed in part because this body of Court opinions present two
different modes of statutory analysis inconsistently applied by
the Court. On the one hand are the Court decisions that have
interpreted the Arbitration Act to fulfill its purpose and to
make it a more useful statute in current times. Other arbitra-
tion decisions, however, are marred by a surprising formalism
coupled with hyperliteral textual glaucoma regarding the arbi-
tration clauses and contracts under review, with the Court
seemingly disinterested in the broader context of the contracts
at issue. It is as if an ordinarily stodgy and formalist Court
pear better candidates for a more literal textual approach or a more formal meth-
odology of interpretation and application.
112 See MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 47, at 68 (citations
omitted):
Early twentieth century American contract law and equity are far
from renowned for the protections they afforded against one-sidedness.
Nonetheless, such principles as fraud, duress, undue influence, and capac-
ity were significant and direct restraints on unfettered freedom of con-
tract. In addition, covert protection was often afforded by rules relating
to consideration and mutuality, and through even more covert techniques
such as interpretation. All of these were available to deal with the prob-
lems seen by anti-reform advocates. Later, principles in general contract
law, such as unconscionability and limitations on the effectiveness of
contracts of adhesion, were developed and became potential or actual
protections against one-sidedness in arbitration agreements.
" See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
11. See supra notes 19-61 and accompanying text.
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temporarily donned dynamic and functional garb in order to
strengthen arbitration but quickly reverted to the mechanical
method so that continued use of the more nuanced approach
would not constrict the newfound reach of arbitration. Whatev-
er the motivation, the chronology suggests that the mechanical
perspective has dominated since the Court engaged in judicial
expansion of the Act more than a decade ago.
On the question of statutory colloquy, the matter is more
complicated. Although Southland can be criticized as judicial
activism for certain elements of the business community, the
decision need not necessarily be the last word on the reach of
the Act. If the Court is "wrong," then Congress has a realistic
possibility of correcting the Court's error through legislation.
The political entities "harmed" by Southland are the states, a
powerful political group that has a realistic means of seeking
legislative reversal. The same is not true of the diffuse, disor-
ganized, poorer and weaker employees who are compelled to
arbitrate job claims against an employer under Gilmer. States
are arguably the losers in the most recent Casarotto Subway
sandwich case as well, as they were in the important predeces-
sor case of Connolly,"' but states vary in their support of
"full disclosure arbitration laws." Consequently, states are
unlikely to storm the ramparts of Congress to legislatively
overrule the Court on this point, particularly if the interest
group pushing them is a group of diffuse franchisees earning
modest incomes rather than the states' business juggernauts.
Overall, the Court's conduct has tended to provide select busi-
ness entities with policies they might well have failed to win in
the electoral arena but which can be protected from legislative
or executive erosion. This is a potentially troubling aspect of
any form of evolutive statutory interpretation and becomes
highly problematic where the Court's dynamism is arguably
misplaced or is coupled with formalist defense and retrench-
ment on the heels of dynamic expansion. The Court might well
have read the American polity correctly when it concluded that
arbitration enjoyed contemporary favor but most likely misread
"' See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989) (ruling
that Massachusetts statute requiring clear disclosure and explanation of arbitration
clause in securities agreement was preempted by federal Act), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 956 (1990).
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things badly to think that the polity or its representatives
meant to embrace the expansive and aggressive mandatory
arbitration of the 1990s. But without the protection of signifi-
cant consent jurisprudence in the courts, domestic politics is a
relatively ineffective vehicle for reforming judicial wrong turns
in arbitration law.
And yet the Court appears to compound rather than cor-
rect its strides down the wrong fork of the interpretative and
adjudicative road. For example, one might ask: If recent Court
decisions about arbitration had little import to other cases (a
criticism leveled in particular at the 1995 decisions),' why
did the Supreme Court grant certiorari and decide them? Legal
scholars have criticized the Court for taking so many personal
jurisdiction cases during the 1980s only to render highly fact-
specific opinions that did little to increase the doctrinal guid-
ance given to lower courts.' The same can be said of the
Court's punitive damages cases of the 1980s and 1990s, which
indicate, often by one-vote majorities, an increasing resistance
to large punitive damages awards but fail to provide readily
applied measures for determining whether such awards are ex-
cessive." 8
But the personal jurisdiction and punitive damages cases
differ from the arbitration cases in one major respect. The
former, even if annoyingly indeterminant, have largely been
decided under the same consistently flexible approach that
seeks to vindicate important due process values. Even if one
disagrees with the Court's personal jurisdiction and punitive
damages opinions, the Court is at least trying to decide these
cases through the same technique-and probably the right
technique: A functional or instrumental approach that seeks to
protect defendants but also to permit courts to continue to be
used to bring tortfeasors and others to justice. Perhaps the
16 See Carboneau, Beyond Trilogies, supra note 79, at 1-2.
117 See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S
ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS (1986).
.. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. CL. 1589 (1996); TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71
(1988).
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Court should have stopped several opinions ago, but at least
the Court is trying to be a part of the solution rather than a
part of the problem.
By contrast, the Court in arbitration seems increasingly
gripped in a wooden methodology of hair-splitting allegiance to
the text of adhesion contracts, combined with formalistic syllo-
gism, of which the Gilmer Court's assertion that employee
Gilmer was not really forced to sign an arbitration clause in
his contract of employment is only the most embarrassing. As
noted above, even in correctly decided cases such as Southland
and Mastrobuono, allowing the defrauded customers to retain
an arbitrator's punitive damages award, the decisions are
presented in more formalist garb, although they are best ex-
plained by a functional and purpose-vindicating analysis.
Generally, the Court ventures into dynamic statutory
interpretation in favor of arbitration but resists it in cases
where it would likely lead to constricted arbitrability. As one
scholar has noted, the Court has a "deregulatory" and
"contractualist" view of arbitration.' 9 To this assessment, I
add with emphasis that there is nothing inherently wrong with
being contractualist about arbitration so long as one practices
a sensible denomination of contractualism, one that holds a
front pew for consent. The type of contractualism I advocate is
therefore more inherently regulatory than the caveat emp-
tor/laissez faire brand of contract practiced by the Court. 2
As Professor Speidel suggests, perhaps even enlightened
contractualism and consideration of consent are insufficient,
and a more overtly regulatory framework is required. But
before more judicial ink is spilled on the Arbitration Act, the
Court would profit from taking cues from cases where it has
avoided formalist solutions.
CONCLUSION
In the post-McMahon world of arbitration between the
securities industry and its customers and the post-Gilmer
world of arbitration between the industry and its employees,
consent concepts have a vital role to play-if only the courts
119 See Oarboneau, Beyond Trilogies, supra note 79, at 2 n.9, 23-25.
120 See Braucher, supra note 38; Shell, supra note 15.
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will let them. Expecting strong legislative or industry trade
group action to protect small shareholders or employees from
nonconsensual mandatory arbitration is a chimera made not
only unlikely, but virtually impossible by the modern form of
politics, where well-heeled interest groups such as the securi-
ties industry possess at least enough political clout to prevent
adverse legislative and executive outcomes. Without doubt, the
securities industry and the business community generally can
protect the victory provided by the courts. Mandatory arbitra-
tion has become the default rule for securities disputes and
threatens to become the system of imposed dispute resolution
for employment and other controversies. Unless the operation
of arbitration programs is so palpably unfair as to create a
scandal, the collective action problems of organizing consumers
to mount political resistance to imposed arbitration are simply
too great." So long as arbitration programs are not obvious
kangaroo courts, they will not be as strictly regulated by the
industry, legislatures or administrative agencies as one would
optimally hope.
In such a setting, the prudential powers of the judiciary
are particularly necessary. Courts are often accused of being
unelected "counter-majoritarian" institutions. Whatever the
credence to the criticism in other contexts, it is not persuasive
in the area of dispute resolution issues implicating the very
notion of access to the courts. The arbitration revolution of the
past decade is not so much the result of a groundswell of pub-
lic opinion as it is an interest group victory.' In a democra-
cy, of course, interest groups are entitled to most of their victo-
' Large institutional customers of the securities industry (e.g., state pension
funds) or wealthy individuals (e.g., Warren Buffett) are an exception: customers
with political clout. But these same entities have the necessary leverage to avoid
arbitration or customize it to their liking in their dealings with the securities in-
dustry. Rationally, they will exercise (and apparently have exercised) this leverage
to help themselves rather than spending additional resources directed toward polit-
ical reform.
'" See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door
Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood, 11
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL 297, 310-15 (1996); Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching
Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1155, 1156-58
(1993) (noting degree to which 1976 Pound Conference organized by Chief Justice
Burger operated to establish new orthodoxy that litigation suffered from severe
problems and required widespread use of ADR as partial cure, in part by present-
ing roster of speakers overwhelmingly critical of litigation status quo).
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ries so long as their political activity stays within the bounds
of the rules. But it certainly does not follow that the arbitra-
tion revolution erased centuries of western society's commit-
ment to consent as a fundamental underpinning of human
relations. In other areas of American society, it remains clear
that consent and autonomy remain bedrock concepts of human
relations.12
Under these circumstances, there remains a vital role for
courts in connection with arbitration and other forms of ADR:
policing the consensual quality of the agreements. No matter
how rational the regulatory framework, no matter how fair
arbitration may be in practice, it should never become a virtu-
ally inescapable default method of dispute resolution. Only
those who have meaningfully consented to arbitration should
be required to arbitrate.124 Unless courts require meaningful
consent, they debase our social norms, the arbitration process
and themselves. During the past decade, however, the judiciary
has done just that in its rush to embrace arbitration at the
expense of the more vital value of consent. Regardless of
whether one describes the judicial failure as the result of
"slouching" or "bootstrapping," the result is a disappointing
jurisprudence uncleansed by even the most efficacious substan-
tive regulation of arbitration.
In his one-volume examination of the Federal Act, Profes-
sor Macneil, Professor Speidel's treatise collaborator, refers to
the expanding evolution of the Act as a jurisprudential "Road
to Damascus. " "25 But the more apt Biblical allusion to the
" Most political rhetoric of the day emphasizes the importance of consent and
autonomy: e.g., proposals for school vouchers; calls for reduced government regula-
tion; greater concern for preventing sexual assault even in the relatively ambigu-
ous contexts of date rape and spousal rape; charter schools; and the generally
libertarian and antigovernmental rhetoric of the day. Although much of this trend
is "pro-market," it hardly follows that the temper of the times is adverse to seri-
ous notions of voluntary consent. On the contrary, coercive markets are not mar-
kets at all.
124 Even if consent is obtained, the Federal Arbitration Act's statement that it
does not apply to a "contract of employment" requires, in my view, that arbitra-
tion agreements are not enforceable against employees. See Stempel, supra note
47. The judiciary's failure to enforce properly this limitation on arbitrability is so
deeply erroneous as to make its securities arbitration jurisprudence shine by com-
parison.
1'2 See MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 47, ch. 14 (The Road
to Damascus). The apostle Paul, then known as Saul, a persecutor of Christians,
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Middle East is that of Judge Bork. Notwithstanding the zeit-
geist favoring arbitration and ADR over traditional litigation, a
world where the courts give greater credence to interest group
preferences and unreal notions of market activity than they
give to a fair reading of legislation and the existence of consent
in contractual relations seems a good deal more like Gomorrah.
was en route to Damascus when suddenly faced with a blinding light. Without
sight, he was taken to Damascus and informed by God that he was a "chosen
vessel" of the Lord's work, whereupon, "there fell from his eyes as it had been
scales: and he received sight forthwith, and arose, and was baptized." See The Acts
9:3-18. In light of Professor Macneirs generally harsh attack on the Court's poor
historicism in interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act, the Damascus analogy is
an odd one-but no odder than the evolution of American arbitration law.
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